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Abstract 
The central question of this analysis is how the proportional representation 
electoral systems in Bolivia, Ecuador, and Peru are linked to indigenous political 
representation. I argue that the electoral system and its affect on party structures and 
party development are part of the reason why indigenous people, who make up a great 
part of the population in these three countries, are chronically under-represented in their 
political systems. In these case studies, district and national level data from the two most 
recent elections for the national legislatures was analyzed in terms of indigenous party 
formation and success. The study concludes that the institutional factors that were 
considered have a negative influence on indigenous representation in Bolivia, Ecuador, 
and Peru, but could gain more explanatory power if viewed in connection with social-
economic factors, such as indigenous cultural values and poverty. 
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Proportional Representation Electoral Systems and Indigenous Representation: 
Case Studies from Bolivia, Ecuador, and Peru 
Introduction 
Indigenous people have often been denied access to and participation in the 
political processes that shape their countries' political environments. This problem seems 
particularly prominent in Latin America, or more specifically in the Andean region, 
which is home to the largest native populace on the continent. While different historical, 
social, and cultural aspects may have contributed to this development, this analysis will 
focus on institutional factors that may have fostered the lack of indigenous representation 
in government institutions, such as the electoral system and its subsequent effects on 
indigenous party structures and party development. 
This study will be centered on the examination of three cases: Bolivia, Ecuador, 
and Peru. These countries are all located in the Andes region, are home to significant 
indigenous populations, and share a similar history. Yet, in terms of the formation of 
indigenous movements and factions, as well as their success at gaining political 
representation at the national level, these states have differed greatly. A central question 
in this analysis is to explain this variance in terms of the electoral system. 
The definition of ethnic identities in Latin America has traditionally been an 
obstacle for scholars. Boundaries between indigenous and non-indigenous people are 
often not clearly defined, as a large part of the population comes from a mixed 
indigenous/non-indigenous origin (i.e. mestizos). Many indigenous also identify 
themselves along socio-economic lines, for example as peasants (particularly in the 
highland areas), which makes it more difficult to distinguish them from peasants of 
another ethnic origin. In places where the term "indio" traditionally carries a negative 
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connotation, as in Peru, a large number of natives refuse to identify themselves overall as 
Indians. 1 It used to be possible to identify indigenous people by their residence, as most 
of them lived in rural areas and followed a non-industrial mode of production. However, 
the increasing urbanization of the Andean countries over the past few decades makes 
such a definition less valid, as many natives have moved to the cities in pursuit of a better 
life. While a great number of these urban dwellers may follow their native traditions to an 
extent (i.e. observe holidays and hold festivities), many have assimilated to the urban 
culture and do not consider themselves distinct from it (Harlowe 2004, Degregori 1999). 
Considering the existence of such intermediate categories and blurred divisions between 
ethnic identities, it becomes evident that a precise definition of indigenous people is 
difficult to find. It seems that the definition used by the United Nations Sub Commission 
on the Prevention ofDiscriminatfon and Protection of Minorities comes closest to 
including all relevant factors, I will therefore apply it to my analysis: 
"Indigenous communities, peoples, and nations are those which, having a historical continuity 
with pre-invasion and pre-colonial societies that developed on their territories, considered 
themselves distinct from other sectors of the societies now prevailing in those territories, or parts 
of them. They form at present non-dominant sectors of society and are determined to preserve, 
develop and transmit to future generations their ancestral territories, and their ethnic identity, as 
the basis of their continued existence as peoples, in accordance with their own cultural patterns, 
social institutions, and legal systems." 
(cited in Van Cott, Donna Lee. 2000. "A Political Analysis of Legal Pluralism in Bolivia 
and Columbia." Journal of Latin American Studies 32(1): 208.) 
The blanket term "indigenous" hides the divisions that exist within the native 
populace, as there are many different languages, nationalities, and traditions (for example 
Quechua, Aymara etc.) Yet it seems that the concept is useful when looking at the 
complex question of the inclusion of aboriginal people in the political processes of a 
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state, since these peoples share a pre-Colombian history, chronic under-representation in 
government, and have continually been discriminated against by other ethnic groups. 
I have chosen the national legislatures of Bolivia, Ecuador, and Peru as the 
objects of this study, for a number of reasons. The legislature seems to provide the 
greatest opportunity for diversity amongst its members, as it is usually made up of a 
larger number of individuals than the executive or judicial branches. Therefore, this 
should be the institution that could provide an entry point to the national political stage 
for indigenous factions more so than the presidency or the highest national court. 
Furthermore, while it may be argued that the legislature has little leverage in regimes 
where the executive branch holds the lion's share of political power (such as Bolivia), 
people still need an outlet for communicating their demands to the government, and the 
legislature can provide that. Furthermore, changes have to start somewhere. A legislative 
body generally has lawmaking powers, even if they are diminished. Representation in 
such an institution could then, theoretically, provide the opportunity to initiate, approve, 
or disprove changes in the content and applicability of a state's legislation. I therefore 
argue that representation in the legislature of the three countries under examination here 
is meaningful.2 
The following three chapters will attempt to find if and how the proportional 
representation electoral systems can affect indigenous representation in national 
legislatures. Each chapter is devoted to one Andean country, and presents findings drawn 
from the two most recent national elections (in the case of Peru also from the latest 
regional election). The goal of this analysis is not to make policy recommendations, but 
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to illustrate first and foremost that electoral rules need to be considered when attempting 
to design a system that allows for the inclusion of formerly excluded sectors of society. 
1 The term indio has indicated inferiority in Bolivia and Ecuador as well (and still does to a certain extent 
today). However, only in the case of Peru have a great number of scholars claimed that the negative 
connotation that is associated with the indigenous label is a significant factor in preventing Peruvian natives 
from identifying themselves along ethnic lines (i.e. Smith 2004, Degregori 1999). 
2 Representation, in institutional terms, is defined as the inclusion in legislative decision-making processes, 
and the opportunity to have proportional input on content and applicability of legislation. 
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CHAPTER 1: Mixed Electoral Systems and Indigenous Representation: 
A Case Study of Bolivia 
Introduction 
In recent years, a number of political movements in Latin America that are based 
on indigenous identity have evolved into organizations that are demanding political 
representation, participation, and the granting of individual and collective indigenous 
rights (Yashar 1998). While scholars such as Horowitz (1985), Huntington and 
Dominguez (1975), and Ted Robert Gurr (1993) have claimed that ethnic politicization in 
Latin America remains weak, over the past decade, significant native organizations and 
parties have emerged at the local and national levels in a number of Andean countries. 
For example, in the 2002 elections, combined Bolivian indigenous parties received 27 
percent of the national vote, an impressive electoral success in a country where the native 
population has been, in political terms, chronically under-represented. The presidential 
elections revealed similar results: the indigenous candidate Evo Morales lost to the 
winner Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada by only a small margin (Van Cott 2003a). These 
outcomes may signify that the native population is finally becoming able to actively 
participate in the political arena, and that this presence can help channel and respond to 
indigenous needs within the system. By looking closer at the specific case of Bolivia, 
where 60 to 70 percent of the total population are indigenous, one may notice that such a 
conclusion may be premature. 
Over the past few years, there have been intensified indigenous protests and 
political violence in this Andean country. In 2000, indigenous movements like CSUTCB 
(Confederaci6n Sindical Unica de Trabajadores Campesinos de Bolivia) initiated 
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roadblocks of the main national highway between two of the most important cities of the 
country, La Paz and Santa Cruz, demanding control over land reform and land rights. 
Members of CIDOB (Confederaci6n Indigena de Bolivia) congregated in Santa Cruz in 
the same year, to present their requests concerning land, education, health, housing and 
natural resources to the government (Gustafson 2002). More importantly, in 2003, 
indigenous protestors initiated roadblocks to publicly object to police authority that had 
arrested one of the group's members. Matters escalated after a fierce battle between 
protestors and police (almost 60 people were killed), and elected Bolivian president 
Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada was forced to resign (A Political Awakening 2004). These 
are only a few examples of recent upheavals. While it would be easy to view these 
actions as isolated instances, I argue that they have a greater implication for the current 
state of Bolivia, and particularly Bolivian indigenous politics. What these events 
demonstrate, overall, is that despite apparently better representation in national and local 
politics, indigenous people do not seem to have sufficient channels within the political 
system to communicate their interests. If we look merely at overall numbers of deputies 
in national or municipal political institutions to measure representation, it would suggest 
that Indians now have a greater influence on political decisions, and that this should 
prevent them from seeking alternative methods of reaching their political goals. This 
however, does not seem to be the case. 
If political representation does not open and provide adequate channels for 
indigenous people to communicate and advocate their interests, then it has failed to fulfill 
its purpose. In the case of Bolivia, then, I hypothesize that the political representation of 
the indigenous population is insufficient, since extra-systemic struggles continue1• 
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Furthermore, I argue that the mixed proportional representation/plurality (PR/plurality) 
electoral system, including party structures and party development as well as the Law of 
Popular Participation (Ley de Participaci6n Popular) have contributed to this lack of 
adequate indigenous representation. 
The dependent variable, political representation, can be defined in various ways. 
Ideally, true electoral representation should reflect the proportion of minority and 
majority shares of the population (Horowitz 2003). In this case, minority and majority 
interests could be addressed in the legislature according to prevalence to the overall 
population. I measure representation in terms of how many delegates of indigenous 
factions are present in political institutions, particularly the national legislature. 
Furthermore, I evaluate the quality of representation, in terms of relative constituency 
size per legislator, and compare it across districts. 
The electoral system is the main independent variable. Throughout this analysis, I 
discuss the theoretical implications of district magnitude, the proportion of PR/plurality 
votes, the way votes are translated into seats (the d'Hondt method which uses highest 
averages and successive divisors to determine to which faction to allocate how many 
seats); and then apply these ideas to the Bolivian case. District magnitude describes the 
number ofrepresentatives that are elected from a multi-member district. Furthermore, the 
party system (meaning the structure that defines the survival rate of parties and inter-
party dynamics), and the evolution of indigenous parties seem to have played an 
important part in the development of Bolivia. I examine what implications this variable 
could have on the present and future evolution of representation of indigenous interests in 
the political arena through a discussion of the nature of indigenous parties, their historical 
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development, and their goals. Finally, the Law of Popular Participation, enacted in 1994, 
and its effects will be evaluated. This law changed the dynamics of government in 
Bolivia drastically, allowing for municipal decentralization and therefore prompting for 
the inclusion of rural areas into the political process. Since the majority of indigenous 
persons populated these areas, it seems logical to suspect that this law may have fostered 
their active involvement in the electoral process. It may also have contributed to the 
further evolution of old indigenous-based movements, as well as the formation of new 
ones. Indigenous parties in the Andes region have been able to succeed more in recent 
elections than in any prior ones. In Bolivia's case, could the electoral and party systems 
and the law of popular participation be inhibiting factors to the full unfolding of this 
trend? 
Debates in the Literature 
The literature on the political representation of indigenous interests throughout 
Latin America in general and in Bolivia in particular has focused on a variety of issues. 
A great part of scholarly work has been concerned with parties and party systems, their 
failure to fully institutionalize, and their seeming inability to represent a broad spectrum 
of societal interests (Coppedge 1998; Mainwaring and Scully 1995; Van Cott 2003a). In 
the past, parties in Bolivia were mainly vehicles used to secure and spread state patronage 
(Gamarra and Malloy 1995). While these objectives are inherent to most party systems, 
when they become the primary role of factions the function of constituency 
representation and integration will obviously be diminished. In more recent times, the 
spectrum of parties in Bolivia has been broadened to include formerly marginalized 
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groups of society. This happened mainly due to the evolution of parties out of indigenous 
social movement organizations (Van Cott 2003a). 
Not much has been published containing country-specific studies of indigenous 
party development and its role in promoting the representation of indigenous interests. 
Andolina (1999), in his comparison of Ecuadorian and Bolivian indigenous movements, 
is hopeful because Indians themselves are now becoming involved in their own 
representation, meaning that they are gaining a broader understanding of formal politics. 
If this trend continues, they may be able to promote their interests themselves within the 
political system rather than having to rely on non-indigenous actors to do so. Different 
native movement organizations, despite conflicting ideas, are learning to work together. 
This then can increase their chance at political success. Indigenous parties today built 
their platform on distinct ethnic identity, rather than on the basis of cultural assimilation 
to non-indigenous people, as had been projected by Needler (1967). This may be an 
indication that these parties are able to bring better representation of the heterogeneous 
nature of the country to the political arena by not conforming to the former domination of 
non-indigenous elites. 
Van Cott (2002), through her case studies of six Latin American countries and 
ethnic parties within each, finds that institutional change is necessary to allow for the 
formation of ethnic factions. While Van Cott generally sees the ongoing process of 
indigenous politicization through a positive lens, ascribing success to inter-systemic 
changes and reforms such as the Law of Popular Participation and the constitutional 
reform, there are scholars that view these as failures of such institutional mechanisms. 
Yashar (1999) finds that the current state of indigenous movements reflects the weakness 
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of the ongoing state-building and decentralization processes in Bolivia. When we assume 
that the inclusion of indigenous peoples and the overall consolidation of democracy is 
possible through government institutions alone, indigenous communities can be harmed. 
Both scholars, then, argue that analysis of change in political institutions needs to be 
supplemented with consideration ofreal-life effects of these reforms. In studying the 
interplay between the two factors (institutional change and its impact on social and 
economic realities), one should be able to gain a more complete understanding of 
successes and challenges that are brought about by institutional modification. 
The current scholarly debate then is centered on the perceived successes and 
failures of institutional reform in the process of granting access to the political system to 
indigenous, largely marginalized populations. Gustafson (2002) warns that one should 
not overestimate the impact of what he calls "neo-liberal interculturalism." This should 
not be understood as a phenomenon that will grant citizenship to indigenous peoples 
unilaterally, but will in fact move national political opposition forces away from the 
center of national politics and further legitimize national political parties that are 
managed by urban elites. This rather negative assessment of reforms implemented in 
Bolivia would in a way support the hypothesis examined in this analysis, since the 
electoral system is part of institutional reform and is supposed to be an attempt at better 
representing the heterogeneous interests of Bolivian society. Donoso (2000) spells out 
more clearly that he does not consider the reforms as being successful in helping to 
overcome the lack of open and tolerant interaction of society. He asserts that the 
modifications of the electoral system and constitution merely helped the most visible part 
of representation, namely the part concerned with the election of the representative; but 
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did not improve the functioning of the representative system and the social effects of 
economic policy. 
The Law of Popular Participation (LPP) is an example of an institutional change 
aimed at increasing indigenous participation and access to political resources. The LPP 
was passed and implemented in 1994. It's ultimate goal is a representative democracy, 
and to reduce poverty, particularly in the rural areas. Due to this law, political power was 
decentralized from the national government to new municipal governments, providing 
rural areas that had traditionally been excluded from the political process with access to 
formal government. The establishment of organizaciones territoriales de base (OTB) was 
intended to grant local actors influence over matters that concerned the population, such 
as education, healthcare etc. They also formed so-called surveillance committees, who 
directly influence municipal policy (Andersson 1999, Calderon and Laserna 2003). These 
organizations, then, provided an entry point to the political arena at the local level, 
therefore serving as a breeding ground for future politicians. Many indigenous 
community organizations were included in the OTBs, providing them with a channel to 
communicate interests and being able to be actively involved in any decisions made that 
regarded their community. The local constituency directly elected municipal officials 
(Van Cott 2003a). This made the government appear closer and be able to address the 
specific needs of the local population, and at the same time made it easier to hold the 
governing elites responsible for their policies. Scholars' evaluation of the success of this 
decentralization project varies. In a series of works, Van Cott (2000a; 2000b; 2003a; 
2003b) looks at this law as an effective means of organizing the indigenous at the local 
level and later to extend their influence to the national level. The effects of 
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decentralization were discussed in terms of affecting the diversity of representatives at 
the local, and to a certain extent, at the national level, since giving municipalities more 
political power seems to foster the development of regional parties, that may grow to 
compete at the national level. However, Andersson (1999) finds that this law promotes 
the manifestation of old elites as new rulers, failing to reconstruct power roles in a way 
beneficial to the indigenous. Calderon and Laserna (2003) note that the law helps create 
new organizational structures at the expense of traditional popular organizations, such as 
syndicates and civil committees, which were respected and preferred by many indigenous 
people. 
Other factors relevant to representation that are discussed in the literature include 
Van Cott's (2000) notion that cultural boundaries and racial discrimination prevented the 
indigenous population from entering the class of the ruling elites. Furthermore, the basic 
rejection of the concept of political representation by many indigenous cultures further 
complicates the task of working within the system. Indigenous people often times prefer 
direct political participation that is based on the model of the Andean communities, or 
ayllus (Van Cott 2000, 157). 
Mixed electoral systems have become an increasingly interesting object of study 
for political scientists. At least 29 countries have adopted this type of electoral system by 
now (Massicotte and Blais 1999). There is a current debate over the categorization of 
mixed systems. Some argue that dependent (compensatory) and independent (two 
formulas are used independent of one another) systems should be separately classified as 
PR and semi-proportional, respectively (Reynolds and Reilly 1997). Others argue that 
12 
both types (dependent and independent) belong to the same broad category of mixed 
systems (Massicotte and Blais 1999). 
The effect of mixed systems on electoral motivation as well as legislative 
behavior has been studied by various authors (Haspel, Remington and Smith 1998; Moser 
1999). It is argued that strategic voting occurs under mixed systems, where plurality 
votes are allocated to larger parties if electoral rules are designed to benefit larger parties 
(Bawn 1993; 1999; Cox 1997; Reed 1999). A debate also exists about the utility of the 
study of electoral systems. Some scholars see mixed electoral systems as a controlled 
environment for separate studies of each of its components (Moser 1995, 1999; Reed 
1999). However, other political scientists are more concerned with interaction effects 
between the two formulas, and do not agree that PR and plurality can be studied 
separately when they occur in the same election as part of the same system (Cox and 
Schoppa 2002). 
While a number of single-country studies have been conducted looking at the 
change of the electoral system to a mixed system and its effects on party system 
development, little research that has been done on the specific effect of the electoral 
system on indigenous representation (Birch 2000; D 'Alimonte and Bartolini 1997; 
Ishiyama and Kennedy 2000; Katz 1996; Mckean and Scheiner 2000). Mainwaring and 
Scully ( 1995) acknowledge the importance of electoral laws in influencing the 
configuration of party competition. Van Cott (2003a) looks at different components of an 
electoral system such as the electoral rule, representation threshold, district magnitude, 
ballot access, decentralization and special reserved minority seats in her analysis of 
ethnic parties in Latin America. She finds that the greater district magnitude, the more 
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favorable it is to the formation of new parties. Coppedge (1997), on the other hand, in his 
examination of 62 Latin American elections between 1914 and 1995, finds that changes 
in district magnitude are rarely large enough to make a real difference. Overall, the 
literature seems seems to be split into two camps; Those who find that the political 
situation in Bolivia is favorable to the evolution and inclusion of indigenous parties, and 
therefore helps the representation of indigenous peoples (Van Cott 2000b; Andolina 
1999), and those that find that, despite political reforms, indigenous people are still 
disadvantaged (Calderon and Laserna 2003; Donoso 2000; Gustafson 2002). I hope to 
add to the latter literature in showing how indigenous representation is affected by the 
electoral system. 
Data and Methodology 
I focus my analysis of the electoral system on the legislative branch of 
government in Bolivia, more specifically on the lower chamber (Camera de los 
Diputados). In analyzing the question of representation, I argue that since this part of the 
Congress is made up of more individuals than the upper house (130 versus 27 seats, 
respectively), it could provide more diversity, and therefore representation of multiple 
interests. The lower house is also the institution that is elected by the mixed electoral 
system under investigation here (mixed PR/plurality). 
In order to assess the dynamics of the electoral system and their influence on 
representation, I examine the outcome of the 2002 elections. Since indigenous parties 
won a significant amount of votes (27 percent combined) for the first time, and I am 
evaluating indigenous representation, it seems that this data would be the most 
appropriate for the purpose of this study. Rather than just assessing aggregate, national 
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level data, I compare district level data in terms of district magnitude, seat allocation by 
party and by method of election (plurality versus PR). I take into consideration that a 
number of districts have a significantly higher proportion of indigenous inhabitants. It 
will be very difficult to control for this variable numerically, because a significant 
number of indigenous people are not registered with the government, and reliable census 
data is therefore difficult to obtain (Calderon and Laserna 2003). Furthermore, 
information about voter registration from the Corte Nacional Electoral2 does not 
discriminate for ethnic background; a distinction between regions with mainly indigenous 
voters is therefore difficult to make. Instead, I will consider the linguistic make-up of 
each department3 to determine the approximate size of its indigenous population. While 
this measure does not provide the exact proportion of indigenous peoples living in each 
district, I argue that it is a close estimate of the concentration of native inhabitants. The 
data are derived from the Instituto Nacional de Estadistica de Bolivia, a governmental 
institution. 
Table 1.1 shows the estimated percentages of people who speak indigenous 
languages for each district. Based on these estimations, I apply a 51 percent threshold to 
classify districts with a large indigenous population 4• I argue that this threshold is 
meaningful since it includes departments where the majority of inhabitants are 
indigenous. If the electoral system produces outcomes representative of the population 
these districts should elect larger numbers of indigenous deputies than those where the 
majority of the population is white, mestizo, or of another non-native background. 
The data that are examined in the analysis come from a variety of sources, such as 
the Corte Nacional Electoral of Bolivia, the Instituto Nacional de Estadistica de Bolivia, 
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the Base de Datos Politicos de las Americas5, and the website w~vw.bolivia.coJJ1. Cross-
examination of the electoral results and distribution of votes by districts, as well as of seat 
assignment to candidates, helped validate the data, since the same results were obtained 
from governmental, non-governmental, local and international sources. 
The effect of the electoral system on party development and party system change 
needs to be considered when evaluating electoral system impact on indigenous 
representation. Parties have historically been the organizations that were allowed to 
participate in electoral competitions; they can therefore be considered the connection 
between the ordinary population and the governing elites. Parties' functions also include 
the provision of political training and education, so-called grooming, of future candidates. 
Due to their organized and, ideally, institutionalized nature, political parties can be a 
valuable vehicle for communicating and advancing the interests of small and large groups 
of people. In order to achieve adequate indigenous representation in the legislature, it 
seems then important that viable parties are able to form and be competitive in electoral 
races. The nature of the electoral system in a country has an impact on what type of 
parties are able to form and whether they are viable. If the electoral system in Bolivia 
then provides an environment supportive of indigenous representation, it should be 
reflected, to a certain extent, in the level of development and success of indigenous 
parties. 
In focusing on indigenous parties in Bolivia over the past ten years (the time span 
the current mixed member proportional (MMP) system has been in place), I evaluate the 
following questions: have indigenous parties formed? 6 How stable are these parties? 
How successful are they? 7 I measure stability in terms of fragmentation, and determine 
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whether these parties have suffered from being split up into different factions after 
elections. Fragmented parties are considered to be less stable, since they lack internal 
cohesion. Stability, as well as viability, will also be considered in years of existence since 
1994, since it seems logical that parties that had a longer time to evolve have a greater 
chance to recruit membership and gamer voter support, as well as develop their 
institutional structure. Finally, I compare their electoral success in both the 1997 and the 
2002 elections, specifically in districts with a large indigenous population, as an indicator 
of success and viability. Furthermore, I discuss whether the party is characterized as 
being moderate or extremist, since centrist or moderate parties generally appeal to a 
larger part of the electorate, and therefore seem to stand a better chance at garnering 
broader vote support than parties that are ideologically far removed from the center. I do 
not expect for these measures to be conclusive, since only ten years and two national 
elections have occurred since the MMP system was put in place. However, after a 
decade under MMP, the results should, at the very least, be indicative of whether the 
current electoral system seems to allow for indigenous representation to occur at all and if 
so, at what level. 
When considering the politicization of indigenous people in Bolivia, in the sense 
of the formation of indigenous factions and political outreach to formerly excluded 
communities, one cannot neglect the impact of the LPP. While this is not directly related 
to national legislative elections, the decentralization of political power seems to have 
significantly increased indigenous political mobilization at the local level. A discussion 
of this impact and possible consequences for future representation of indigenous interests 
will make this analysis more relevant in terms of institutional change, since political 
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representation does not seem to be the result of the electoral system by itself. 
Furthermore, since both the MMP system and the LPP were put in place in the same year, 
it is difficult to distinguish which factor had the greater impact on the formation of 
indigenous parties, and co-collinearity could become a problem. 
Discussion and Results 
The Electoral System 
The MMP system currently used in Bolivia lets voters chose their 130 
representatives for the lower chamber of the legislature from two different ballots. Sixty-
eight members are chosen in single member districts by plurality voting, and the 
remaining sixty-two members are chosen in nine different multi-member districts from 
party lists according to PR (Reynolds and Reilly 1997; Massicotte and Blais 1999; Van 
Cott 2003a). The PR seats are distributed with a three percent threshold according to the 
d'Hondt rule (since 1996). In districts with a small district magnitude, this formula tends 
to slightly favor larger parties (Taagepera and Shugart 1989). The overall formula for the 
allocation of seats is correctional: Candidates that are chosen in single-member districts 
are rewarded seats directly, and PR seats are then allocated as a compensation to reflect 
the overall percentage of votes won by each party.8 This formula is supposed to correct 
the distortions created by plurality systems, and therefore make the overall allocation of 
seats more proportional (Reynolds and Reilly 1997). 
Indigenous parties that were able to win national seats in 20029 received 25.4 
percent (33 of 130) of available seats, which is, at first glance, fairly proportional to their 
27 percent share of the popular vote (in plurality and PR districts combined). When we 
look at the district level data, as seen in Table 1.2, we will notice that overall, a higher 
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percentage of plurality seats were won by indigenous parties in regions with a high 
concentration of indigenous inhabitants. Almost all of the seats distributed under PR 
rule to indigenous factions were also won in departments with a high concentration of 
indigenous inhabitants. In these districts, it therefore seems that the electoral system 
promotes indigenous representation; I focus on these districts in the following discussion. 
To be able to draw valid conclusions, the data need to be examined closer: If the electoral 
rules truly promote indigenous representation, votes and seats for indigenous members of 
parliaments should be increasing with the size of the district. I assume that in the district 
with the largest indigenous population, the interest in representing indigenous interests is 
the greatest. Therefore, the proportion of indigenous seats won here compared to overall 
seats should be greatest. 
Table 1.2 shows, however, that the percentage of seats won by indigenous 
factions is largest in the department with the second lowest majority margin of 
indigenous over non-indigenous inhabitants (La Paz), and lowest in the department with 
the smallest majority margin of indigenous residents (Chuquisaca). The difference 
between these two districts is a substantial 24 percent. However, Chuquisaca can be 
treated as an outlier in this study, because population dynamics here are very close to the 
threshold of a 51 percent indigenous majority (see Table 1.1 ). An interesting observation, 
however, is that the district that was expected to yield the greatest percentage of 
indigenous seats because of its great native population (Potosi, 76% speakers of native 
languages) only came in fourth place. While the difference between the result in Potosi 
and the other three contenders (La Paz, Cochabamba, and Oruro) is not substantial 
(between 33 and 42 percent of all available seats were won by indigenous factions in all 
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four departments), the difference needs to be considered. One could speculate that the 
number of districts under plurality has skewed the results. One may argue that in a 
department with a larger number of single member districts more indigenous candidates 
would have a chance to get elected, since more electoral races could be run. According 
to Table 1.2, however, this does not seem to have been the case in the 2002 Bolivian 
elections, since candidates in Cochabamba secured five of nine available plurality seats 
(or 53 percent), where in La Paz only seven of sixteen seats (or 44 percent) were won. A 
department with almost twice as many electoral races for parliamentary seats then was 
not able to send a larger percentage of representatives to Congress. Once again the 
difference between these two figures is not large, however it should be sufficient to 
indicate that the number of plurality districts within one department does not seem to be a 
determinant of the proportion of seats won by indigenous parties. 
Having considered the number of single member districts within departments, I 
will now assess the impact of district magnitude under PR. In comparison, the 
differences between the percentages of seats distributed to indigenous parties under PR 
are not large. 10 The fact that seats were distributed, however, shows that district-wide, 
indigenous parties did receive a substantial amount of votes under PR, otherwise parties 
would not have been compensated for their vote share. A larger district magnitude here, 
however, seems to have a slightly positive impact on the amount of votes indigenous 
parties were able to secure. In La Paz, the department with the largest district magnitude 
of fifteen, indigenous parties won 39 percent of votes, where in Potosi (district magnitude 
of seven) and Oruro (district magnitude of five) they were able to secure 28 and 31 
percent of the vote, respectively. Despite the fact that these differences are not immense, 
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we should consider that Potosi and Oruro have a proportionally larger indigenous 
population than La Paz (see Table I. I), and therefore have a larger pool of potential 
indigenous voters. This finding may indicate that voters are more inclined to select 
candidates from indigenous factions if there are more candidates available overall. The 
fact that La Paz was able to secure the most seats proportionally in comparison with other 
departments may also be a result of the d'Hondt rule, which seems to favor larger parties 
in areas with a small district magnitude (Taagepera and Shugart I 989). Since La Paz has 
the highest district magnitude of all departments, a small indigenous party like the 
Movimiento Indigeno Pachakuti (MIP) could gamer seventeen percent of votes, the 
largest percentage it won in any of the departments. In regards to PR then, the relatively 
small district magnitude of departments in Bolivia seems to have a slightly negative 
effect on indigenous representation. 
Another factor that may indicate how representative a Congress member is of his 
or her constituency is how well he or she is able to respond to voters' needs and wants. 
After all, he or she is the channel through which constituents can communicate their 
demands on the government. Table I.3 shows a simple mathematical comparison of the 
number of Camera de los Diputados representatives by department and the size of the 
population in each department. The results clearly indicate that there are major 
differences in terms of how many people each deputy would be representative of ifthe 
number of a department's inhabitants was evenly divided between all deputies (plurality 
and PR). I cannot claim that the number of persons per representative (Table 1.3) is even 
a close approximation to the true number (to assume that each representative would be 
responsible to the exact same number of constituents would be highly irrational since 
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district sizes and population density vary). However, it is reasonable to assume that this 
value gives us an idea of how many people a member of Congress is representative of on 
average. Let us consider the case of the largest department, La Paz: If the population was 
evenly divided so that each representative would answer to an equal share of constituents, 
61,316 people's interests would be represented in Congress by one person. In Pando, the 
smallest of the departments population-wise, one legislator represents 4, 759 people. 
Even if we consider this comparison extreme (Pando seems to be an outlier), in the 
second-smallest district Tarija, the proportion is one representative per 32,378 
inhabitants. The difference is therefore substantial. 
I would argue that the number of representatives allocated to each department 
grossly undermines the representation of the indigenous populace, for several reasons. 
The majority of indigenous people, according to the data in Table 1.1, live in departments 
with a greater population size. The greater the population size, the more constituents have 
to share a representative. I will argue that an MP is more easily able to respond to the 
interests of few rather than many. Moreover, representation is not proportional if more 
constituents have to share an MP in some areas than in others. If there is a district, for 
example, that is comprised of 60,000 people, and they only have one channel to the 
government (one representative), it would seem more likely that this particular channel is 
too small or inefficient to address all their needs, compared to a district where 5,000 
people share access to one representative. 
Another factor to consider is that in districts with a higher concentration of the 
population, it takes more individuals to successfully vote their representative of choice 
into office. Since the indigenous population in Bolivia is concentrated in areas with a 
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larger population, this may work to their disadvantage. In districts with a smaller 
population, and in the case of Bolivia a smaller concentration of indigenous people, the 
number of individuals required to elect a representative is significantly smaller (see Table 
1.3). Election results may therefore be skewed towards non-indigenous people, since a 
smaller number of them can elect a proportionally larger number of non-indigenous 
representatives. Furthermore, when one legislator is representative of a larger number of 
constituents than another, it could mean the constituents of the first legislator have less 
power to influence the legislative process. I will try to illustrate this idea further with a 
simple, hypothetical example: 
Let us assume Congress consists of deputies X, Y, and Z, and it is voting on the 
implementation of bilingual education for indigenous children. Deputy X is from La Paz, 
and therefore representative of a large number of constituents. Deputies Y and Z are 
from Pando, and therefore representative of a significantly smaller number of 
constituents. When the three deputies vote on bilingual education, each one of their votes 
is weighted equally, and legislators Y and Z can easily block the implementation of 
bilingual education through their votes. While Deputy X may be the representative of 
60,000 people, deputies Y and Z combined may only represent the voices of 10,000 
people. Constituents of deputies Y and Z are therefore at an advantage: They have two 
rather than one channel of communication to share between fewer of them (they have two 
representatives), they have more influence over the decisions that are being made in 
Congress because they have more voting power. Bolivians, then, that live in areas with a 
high population concentration, may be disadvantaged. The number of representatives per 
department is constant, so if one deputy's district has less inhabitants, another one's 
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district in the same department will have more. Overall, then, the total population of the 
department is represented by that fixed number of deputies, which determines how much 
the people's vote counts. Since indigenous people are concentrated in the areas with 
larger populations, I argue that their representation suffers, and that they tend to have 
fewer deputies and therefore votes in Congress to get their policy interests realized. This 
unequal distribution of seats per share of the population (see Table 1.3), then, seems to be 
one of the factors that can help explain why the indigenous population in Bolivia, which 
makes up an estimated 60-70 percent of the entire populace, is only represented through 
25 percent of the votes in the lower house of Congress. 
Parties 
The formation of political parties as vehicles for indigenous representation in the 
Bolivian Congress has been only moderately successful. Throughout the past, and to a 
certain extent in the present, indigenous parties have been plagued with the same growing 
pains as most other Latin American factions. These include, for example, fragmentation 
caused by internal struggles over leadership and agenda, a short period of subsistence 
which may prevent members from gaining enough experience to be fit for electoral 
competition, corruption, clientilism and personalism, and, specifically in the case of 
indigenous parties, the mobilization of enough voters to succeed in elections (as was 
mentioned before, many indigenous people are not registered with the government) (Patzi 
Paco 1999). Furthermore, party registration rules and other institutional "hurdles" made 
it difficult for indigenous parties to gain a foothold in national elections. 11 To 
understand the development of indigenous parties in Bolivia better, I explore their 
historical background briefly. 
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Initially, in the late 1970s, there were two different camps of indigenous ideology: 
the radical Indianismo and the more pragmatic Katarismo. 12 The latter of the two became 
more successful, partially due to an image that was of a more liberal and less ethnic-
based nature, and therefore attractive not just to Indians but also to those who could 
provide political and financial support. Electoral alliances with non-indigenous factions 
were also helpful in garnering votes. The Movimiento Revolucionario Tupaj Karati de 
Liberaci6n (MR TKL) succeeded in winning two seats in the lower chamber of Congress 
in 1985. In 1993 the Vice-President of Bolivia came from this party, made possible 
through an electoral alliance with the right-wing Movimiento Nacionalista 
Revolucionaria (MNR) (Van Cott 2003a). However, the electoral success did not 
continue, due in part to the fact that party leader Victor Hugo Cardenas failed to 
consolidate the MRTKL as a viable, independent political party. Most indianismo and 
katarismo parties split into different factions and died in the 1980s. 
Other indigenous parties formed out of indigenous movements and federations. 
The highland Indians organized the Confederaci6n Sindical Unica de Trabajadores 
Campesinos13 de Bolivia (CSUTB} in 1979, which became one of the main vehicles for 
party development. The Quechuan coca growers of the Cochabamba region soon 
dominated the movement. In the lowlands, the Confederaci6n Indigena del Oriente 
Boliviano (CIDOB) was formed a few years later, to organize peasants. The latter 
movement was of a less radical nature, and played a key role in gaining support from 
,non-indigenous and politically powerful elites. At a meeting of both organizations in 
1995, the indigenous party Asamblea de la Soberania de los Pueblos (ASP) was formed 
to represent indigenous interests within the established system, and it succeeded in 
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garnering a small number of seats in the National Assembly. Disputes between the two 
leaders of the party, Evo Morales and Alejo Veliz, led to a split in 1998. The latter of the 
two stayed with what was left of the ASP, while Evo Morales founded a new party, the 
Instrumento Politico para la Soberania de los Pueblos (IPSP). The ASP's success waned 
over the next two elections, while the IPSP (under the registration of the nearly defunct 
Movimiento al Socialismo -MAS) was able to win a considerable number of votes in the 
2002 elections (21 percent). Additionally, the very young and radical indigenous party 
MIP under leader Felipe Quispe14 was able to secure 6 percent of the popular vote, 
despite the fact that the MIP is an opponent to the IPSP (Van Cott, 2003a). 
While this could be an indication of the consolidation of indigenous parties and 
their interests in the political sphere, we should avoid drawing conclusions too quickly. 
While the number of representatives of indigenous interests in the Chamber of Deputies 
has risen, this does not guarantee a continuation of this trend in the future. Neither does it 
necessarily mean that these parties will be sustained nor attempt to realize indigenous 
demands. As can be seen in Table 1.4, no indigenous party has been in existence and 
successful for even a decade. No indigenous party has been able to secure a large 
number of votes in two consecutive national elections since 1994. Furthermore, three of 
the four indigenous factions have not run in two consecutive elections since 1994. An 
argument could be made that the IPSP and MIP have taken the place of the Consciencia 
de Patria (Condepa) party and the ASP, as the latter two factions have lost their influence 
on the political stage due to fragmentation. Condepa, for example, was deeply split 
internally after the death of its leader Carlos Palenque (Van Cott 2003b ). This shows that 
the faction lacked institutionalization and an independent structure, since its leader seems 
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to have been the figure that prevented it from collapsing. While it would be difficult to 
reason that this is the case with all Bolivian indigenous parties, it is hard to imagine an 
IPSP without Evo Morales or an MIP without Felipe Quispe. 
The charismatic nature of most successful Bolivian party leaders is a 
disadvantage here, because it may prevent parties from building an internal structure that 
can survive without the leader. It seems that throughout indigenous party history in 
Bolivia, the most promising factions seemed to collapse or split up (non-indigenous 
parties have experienced this as well, but to a smaller extent). It is yet to be seen if this is 
the case with the IPSP or the MIP. This observation, however, indicates that, so far, the 
party system has not been stable since the MMP electoral system was adopted. I argue 
that a stable party system, since it should include viable, internally consolidated parties, is 
important to achieve indigenous representation in government. Parties that are not yet 
steadfast in terms of their platform and organizational structure will most likely be less 
effective at channeling demands to the government. Since indigenous people and factions 
have traditionally been excluded from the ruling elites and are now just beginning to gain 
a foothold in the national legislature, it is especially important for them to develop 
factions that are internally coherent and externally competitive with older, more dominant 
non-indigenous parties. The electoral system can shape this relationship. 
Smaller parties should theoretically be able to benefit from the PR component 
(Reynolds and Reilly 1997, Massicotte and Blais 1999). While the plurality system by 
itself tends to favor larger parties, it may, in the case of Bolivia, contribute to the 
inclusion of smaller parties with a geographically concentrated indigenous constituency. 
Table 1.2 reveals that, when indigenous parties were successful, they gained a substantial 
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amount of their votes under plurality. Most votes were collected in the department where 
they originated, followed by the other departments with a high proportion of indigenous 
voters. It seems that the use of the MMP system initially helped the factions gain access 
to the legislature by being able to draw on the strong support in their home districts 
through plurality. Under a different system, for example PR in one national district, 
parties most likely would not have been competitive, with their support base being so 
concentrated in one area (Van Cott 2003a). Under the current electoral system, parties 
can consolidate their power locally, therefore building a niche from where parties can 
attempt to broaden their voter base. The MMP system aided smaller indigenous parties by 
helping them to "get a foot in the door" at national politics. 
However, until now it seems that this is as far as the electoral system supports 
indigenous parties. As discussed before, a stable party system does not seem to have 
developed in Bolivia. And there is a down side to the electoral system's tendency to 
encourage small party entrance onto the political stage. A largely fragmented system that 
allows many minor factions to compete with one another encourages leaders within 
parties to pursue their own personalistic goals and split away with their supporters, rather 
than trying to work out differences internally and present a unified front externally to 
keep the party competitive and therefore viable. Splintering away has at least two 
negative effects on a party: First, it diminishes the supporter base a faction has, since it 
divides its members and therefore also its potential voters. It therefore will diminish 
electoral success. Second, fragmentation discourages intra-party bargaining. This can be 
an important experience for future deputies, since bargaining is one of the key functions a 
deputy has within Congress, especially in a chamber where seats are divided between 
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many parties. Compromise between different factions is essential to get any legislation 
passed, unless there is one party that has the absolute majority, which is not the case in 
Bolivia. A system that encourages competition between small indigenous parties rather 
than their consolidation therefore seems incapable of yielding stable, viable indigenous 
factions. 
The electoral system also promotes the success of extremist parties. Felipe 
Quispe's MIP, for example, is considered to be radical even by more moderate 
indigenous parties. Initially, this party's success created the overall impression that 
indigenous representation is increasing. However, I believe that there is not much room 
for this party to grow since its agenda and goals appeal to a narrowly defined part of the 
indigenous population (the nationalist separatists) (Van Cott 2003b). Furthermore, it 
seems that this party has fed on the national mood of dissatisfaction with the 
government's policies to garner its votes, as can be seen in its militant mobilizations 
against the national government prior to the 2002 elections. If this mood fades, so will 
the success of this extremist faction. While it has then helped more militant indigenous 
people to garner representation in the national legislature for now, its viability in the 
future is questionable. The MIP did not develop out of a grass roots organization where it 
could have secured a broad supporter base: its chances for building an independent 
internal structure therefore seem limited. That this small, extremist faction was able to 
rise at all, illustrates once again how the electoral system promotes splintering among 
interest groups, a fragmented party system, and therefore hinders indigenous 
representation. The IPSP could, for example, have absorbed the more militant 
indigenous interest groups, garnered more seats, and presented a unified opposition to the 
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non-indigenous parties. Fragmentation between indigenous parties is what gives the 
older, non-indigenous parties an edge, and lets them dominate the political stage while 
they represent the minority of the population. I argue that truly proportional indigenous 
representation in Congress will not be achieved until a stable party system and unified, 
mass-based indigenous parties are able to form and consolidate. While the MMP system 
allows parties to enter the political stage, it does not seem to encourage factions to 
develop there. 
LPP: Law of Popular Participation (Ley de Participaci6n Popular) 
Indigenous representation at the municipal level has drastically increased since 
the LPP was implemented. Indigenous organizations have been able to draw upon their 
local support base and increasingly politicized themselves. In many communities with a 
high indigenous population, decentralization has helped them gain a voice in the 
administration of local policies. This then shows that the formation of indigenous parties 
and their electoral success in the 2002 elections was not only a result of the MMP 
electoral system 15 (or more specifically the plurality component that allowed for 
regionally based parties to compete), but can also be attributed to decentralization, since 
it gave indigenous organizations an incentive to politicize and take on an active role in 
the political decision-making processes. 
There are negative aspects of the LPP, however, also for the development of 
indigenous parties, which need to be considered. In a number of municipalities, the 
OTBs were created as parallel organizations to existing indigenous community structures, 
which excludes traditional indigenous authorities from being included in the political 
process (Andersson 1999). This, in tum, alienates the indigenous population from 
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control over their areas, and can prevent the formation oflocal political entities that have 
the potential to grow and improve representation of indigenous interests at the national 
level. Furthermore, it seems that the national government can rid itself of responsibilities 
it cannot satisfy, and simply transfer them to municipal administrations, knowing that it is 
not possible to satisfy these demands at the municipal level either. The national 
government can then use the municipal governments as a "scapegoat" for the failure to 
address pressing issues. 
The allocation of 20 percent of government revenues to the municipal authorities 
is also part of the LPP. The purpose of these funds, despite the fact that they are often 
insufficient, is to give local governments the means to address regional problems, and to 
prevent mass migrations to the urban areas (Calderon and Laserna 2003). However, 
since the use of these funds is mainly overseen by OTBs, problems can develop. 
Differences in fund allocation can cause conflicts between different organizations and 
regions, preventing the successful evolution of mass based indigenous parties. In areas 
where the OTBs are not representative of the majority-indigenous population (as 
discussed above), the power over the distribution of funds by the non-indigenous elites 
further alienates the indigenous people from the political process, defying them the 
opportunity to represent their interests, and to consolidate their local power at the national 
level. While the LPP then, at first glance, has helped increase indigenous politicization at 
the local level, and therefore helped create a platform from where to make the leap to the 
national level, it has not succeeded to do so evenly throughout Bolivia. In some areas, it 
has even promoted the exclusion oflocal indigenous organizations from the political 
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process, and thereby further alienated the native population from achieving 
representation. 
Conclusions 
The findings of this analysis suggest that the political representation of indigenous 
people in the lower house of the legislature has been negatively affected by the MMP 
electoral system. The small district magnitude in PR departments has dampened 
indigenous parties' success. Districts with a high population density, where indigenous 
people are concentrated, have less representation in Congress, because in these areas, 
more people have to share the same deputy than people in less densely inhabited regions. 
The plurality component of the electoral system has helped small indigenous factions 
gain access to the political stage, but at the same time encourages fragmentation within 
those factions. This prevents indigenous parties from consolidating their internal 
structure and support base, and therefore diminishes their viability. While these 
institutional factors have affected indigenous representation in Bolivia negatively, there 
may be more complex dynamics that may have contributed to the chronic under-
representation of the majority of the countries' inhabitants. 
It is, for example, important to note the potential effects of economics on the 
representation of native peoples in the political system. Being poor and being indigenous 
are strongly associated with one another in Latin America, which makes it difficult to 
differentiate between economic and social inequality (Psacharopoulos and Patrinos 
1994). Poor sectors of society usually suffer from lack of representation, since they 
generally have less access to political resources, which can affect voter turnout, for 
example. Potential supporters for indigenous parties may therefore be excluded from the 
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political process. This pool of potential pro-indigenous voters becomes even larger when 
we consider the ten percent of indigenous who have not been registered with the 
government, and are therefore deprived of their right to vote (Calderon and Laserna 
2003). 
Indigenous culture and tradition could also negatively affect their drive for 
political representation. Many Indigenous communities are socially and economically 
organized into ayllus, have their own institutions that deal with processes for grievances, 
and that redistribute income within the community. One example is the cargo system: A 
cargo is the duty to serve as a leader. All male members of the community have to fulfill 
cargos at different levels. They start at the lower levels, and move up to be the head 
leader later in life, when they have gained the necessary experience. All holders of a 
cargo are members of the council of authorities, and any decision regarding the 
community requires consensus from this institution. The leader's power is further 
restricted because each cargo is held for one year only (Andersson 1999). To indigenous 
people, the nationally institutionalized system of representation may therefore seem 
foreign and hard to understand, and may make them reluctant to participate in formal 
political processes. Corruption within the political system, the clientilistic nature of 
parties, and the increasing urbanization of native peoples are also among factors that may 
be considered in future research on indigenous representation in the Bolivian political 
system. 
NOTES: 
1 Evo Morales and Felipe Quispe, Bolivian indigenous leaders and members of the national legislature, 
both asserted in 2003 that if congressional activities did not achieve the goals they had set for indigenous 
policies, they would create social mobilizations (Van Cott 2003a). This demonstrates the idea that extra-
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systemic measures are a reaction to the failure of the system to provide more indigenous representation to 
satisfy interests from within. 
2 The Corte Nacional Electoral is the institution that organizes, administers and validates elections in 
Bolivia. http://www.cne.org.bo 
3 What I refer to as "departments" are regional PR districts, as to avoid confusion with single member 
districts, which are labeled "districts". 
4 The departments that met this threshold were La Paz, Cochabamba, Chuquisaca, Oruro, and Potosi. 
5 This database is maintained by Georgetown University and the Organization of American States. 
http://www.Georgetown.edu/pdba 
6 Indigenous parties are defined as parties that proclaim the introduction and advancement of inherently 
indigenous interests to be the major part of their electoral agenda, that have developed out of indigenous 
communities, and whose membership is mainly comprised of indigenous people. 
7 A party should be considered viable if it can achieve electoral success (here: obtain seats in the 
legislature). 
8 If one party wins three seats through plurality and seven seats in PR districts, it is entitled to three seats 
from single-member districts and four compensatory PR seats, for a total of seven seats. 
9 These parties were the Instrumento Politico para la Soberania de los Pueblos (ISPS), and the Movimiento 
Indigeno Pachakuti. The ISPS was not able to register as a political party, and therefore used the 
registration of the nearly defunct Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS) (Van Cott 2003a). 
10 The percentage of seats received under PR (see Table 1.2) is not reflective of the actual percentage of 
votes received in PR districts, because PR seats are allocated as a compensation in addition to seats not won 
in plurality districts. 
11 One example of these "hurdles" is the law that required parties who did not win at least 50,000 votes to 
pay for printing their ballots (Van Cott, 2003a). Funding is an issue for most small parties, and especially 
for indigenous parties since Indians are mostly part of the lower class. 
12 Indianismo is anti-white and anti-Western and rather radical. Its most successful faction was the 
Movimiento Indio Tupak Katari (MITKA). Katarismo incorporates both Western and non-Western 
cultures, and is generally more moderate (Patzi Paco 1999). 
13 CSUTB was the first unified independent peasant organization in Bolivia (Van Cott 2000). 
14 MIP was founded in 2000, but registered only about 3 months before the June 30 elections (Base de 
Datos Politicos de las Americas). Felipe Quispe and his party seek a separate Aymara nation under pre-
colonial government structures. 
15 Prior to the 1994 reforms, deputies were elected in one closed-list national PR district. For the most part, 
indigenous factions performed poorly under this system (Van Cott 2003a). 
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Table 1.1: Indigenous Linguistic Concentration in Bolivia 
D rt t T t 1 P D s· * I d L ** I d L epa men oa op. ep. 1ze n. ang. n. o/c Rank+ ang o 
Potosi 645,889 4 491,691 76.12% 1 
Oruro 340,114 6 234,892 69.06% 2 
Cochabamba 1,110,205 3 731,302 65.87% 3 
La Paz 1,900,786 1 1,126,773 59.27% 4 
Chuquisaca 453,756 5 244,087 53.79% 5 
Santa Cruz 1,364,389 2 234,577 17.19% -
Pando 38,072 9 1,860 4.86% -
Tarija 291,407 7 13,638 10.86% -
Beni 276,174 8 25,881 9.37% -
*Departments are ranked by overall population size, 1 being the largest. 
**This value is determined by the number of people who speak indigenous languages, 
including Aymara, Quechua, Guarani, and minor native tongues (source: Instituto 
Nacional de Estadistica de Bolivia: www.ine.gov.bo). 
+Districts with a majority of indigenous people (51 %+)are ranked according to size of 

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 1.3: Representation Measured by Size of Represented Population 
D rt t P s· Rank # fR A P R R R nk** epa men op. 1ze 0 eps. vg. ersons per ~ep. ep. a 
La Paz* 1,900,786 1 31 61,316 7 
Santa Cruz 1,364,389 2 22 62,017 9 
Cochabamba* 1,110,205 3 18 61,678 8 
Potosi* 645,889 4 15 43,059 6 
Chuquisaca* 453,756 5 11 41,251 5 
Oruro* 340,114 6 10 34,011 3 
Tarija 291,407 7 9 32,378 2 
Beni 276,174 8 7 39,453 4 
Pando 38,072 9 8 4,759 1 
*This is considered a district with a high indigenous population. 
**A representative is ranked higher if he represents a smaller number of constituents. 
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Table 1.4: Indigenous Party Characteristics Since 1994, Bolivia 
1997 2002 
Part [y y ears s rt 1p IS mo d/ t FPTP* ex PR** FPTP* a PR** All" iance 
ASP 95-02 1 moderate 5.88 (4) 3.22 - -
Condepa 94-02 0 moderate 17.65 (12) 10.79 0 < 1 
IPSP 98-04 0 moderate - - 20.59 17.32 
(14) 
MIP 00-04 0 extremist - - 7.35 (5) 2.58 
*Percentage of indigenous vs. overall seats under FPTP (Total possible: 68) 
**Percentage of votes possible in all PR districts 
a Alliance stands for an alliance with a non-indigenous party or the use of a non-







CHAPTER 2: Parallel Electoral Systems and lndii:enous 
Representation: A Case Study of Ecuador 
As has been observed in Bolivia, Ecuadorian Indians have protested frequently 
over the past decade. Indigenous people make up between 25 and 35 percent of the 
population of Ecuador. The indigenous movement Confederaci6n de Nacionalidades 
Indigenas de Ecuador (CONAIE) has traditionally used peaceful uprisings and 
demonstrations as a vehicle to push for indigenous demands. The most recent uprising 
(levantamiento) happened in January of 2000, when CONAIE and part of the military 
joined together to oust then-President Jamil Mahuad. Despite short-lived success, this 
levantamiento showed that extra-systemic methods might still hold more promise in 
realizing indigenous interests than existing political channels do. Since the uprising 
almost four years and a number of political reforms have passed. The latter have been 
aimed at improving the channels for citizens' political participation. This examination 
then focuses on one aspect of the political system that most directly reflects political 
participation: the electoral system, and the effects it has on indigenous political 
representation. While overall electoral success has increased, representation does not 
seem to have followed that trend. I hypothesize that the Ecuadorian parallel Proportional 
Representation (PR) electoral system is partially responsible for the lack of effective 
political representation of indigenous demands at the national legislative level. I argue 
that the electoral system has discouraged the formation of fully institutionalized 
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indigenous factions, and supports unviable alliances between existing indigenous political 
movements and other factions. 
The dependent variable, political representation can bear many definitions. In this 
case, I will follow Lucero' s (2002) layout of a definition of representation in institutional 
terms: Representation here means the inclusion of all sectors of society in the legislative 
decision-making process, with a proportional amount of input and power over the content 
and applicability oflegislation. I measure representation in terms of how many delegates 
from indigenous factions are present in the national legislature, and if this number reflects 
the proportional amount of voice indigenous people should have in the political process. I 
also apply broader terms and evaluate if the delegates are actually responsible for 
channeling primarily indigenous demands or have to answer to other ethnic groups as 
well. 
The electoral system is the main independent variable. I consider a number of its 
components, such as vote type, seat allocation, and district magnitude. I examine what 
effects these factors could have on the successful evolution of indigenous political actors 
(parties or political movements), and their electoral success. This analysis should provide 
a greater understanding of whether electoral system dynamics have helped propel greater 
indigenous political representation, and why. 
Debates in the Literature 
The literature on indigenous issues in Ecuador is marked by an abundance that is 
not easily matched by the number of works pertaining to the same subject in other 
Andean countries. A number of different subjects have been the focus of the debate 
surrounding the evaluation of indigenous representation in the political arena, including 
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the discussion of social movements, the electoral system during and after the most recent 
reforms, and both of those factors' effects on indigenous party and party system 
development and institutionalization. 
A great part of this scholarly work has concerned itself with the evolution and 
success of CONAIE, which is generally credited with being the "most organized and 
institutionalized indigenous movement in Latin America." (MacDonald 2002: 176) In 
providing a high capacity for the mobilization of indigenous peoples, the movement has 
succeeded at uniting the differently motivated interests of diverse indigenous groups 
under the umbrella of the struggle for inclusion and participation in the nation's decision-
making processes. The collective identity of indigenous peoples in Ecuador, achieved 
gradually through the linkage of high- and lowland indigenous groups achieved by 
CONAIE over a period of almost twenty years, has served as a strategic resource for an 
increased national and international visibility of the indigenous population, advanced 
through non-violent uprisings and constant bargaining with traditional political elites 
(Lucero 2002; MacDonald 2002; Selverston-Scher 2001). 
There is a general agreement between scholars such as Flavia Freidenberg (2001) 
and MacDonald (2002) that CONAIE has been successful in negotiating indigenous land 
claims, advancing communication between political agencies and the social movement, 
advancing the indigenous platform from the local to the broader national level, and 
pushing for the official proclamation of Ecuador as a plurinational state, to name a few. 
However, these achievements, for the most part, took place outside of the direct channels 
of political participation by citizens (such as elections, parties, and elected 
representatives). It seems that while such achievements are certainly important steps 
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forward in the pursuit of direct citizen participation in the political arena, they do not 
necessarily provide for political space for indigenous interests within the legislative and 
executive branches of government. 
The degree of success that Ecuadorian Indians have achieved within these 
channels has prompted different evaluations. Flavia Freidenberg (2001 ), as one of the 
predominant scholars of indigenous party development in Ecuador, concerns herself with 
the evolution and intra-systemic success of the primarily indigenous political 
organization Movimiento Unidad Plurinacional Pachakutik- Nuevo Pais (MUPP-NP). 
She finds that since the movement first came into existence in 1996, it has been 
exceptionally successful at winning seats in the National Assembly, and at channeling the 
demands of the indigenous sector of society into the political arena (for example the 
consideration of the ethnically motivated differences in the Ecuadorian society). The 
author attributes another favorable characteristic to the movement: it has formed around a 
program, not a leader, and should therefore be better able to institutionalize. 
MacDonald (2002) is more careful in his evaluation of the MUPP-NP. While he 
asserts that the movement has been successful in creating political space for indigenous 
interests and helped secure some inclusion of the indigenous population into political 
decision-making processes, he finds that the movement's deputies in Congress were not 
sufficiently unified in the past to effectively participate and affect legislation. It seems 
that a political movement that is struggling to join the people representing it in the 
legislature is not an internally cohesive faction, therefore lacking institutionalization, 
making its predictable success record questionable. A more positive trend has been 
observed by Lopez (2002) in his analysis of problems in local and regional elections in 
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2000, as he finds that the legitimacy crisis in the Ecuadorian party system is expressing 
the growing efficacy of political movements as mechanisms of recruitment and 
determination of new rules in the political game. This finding then would suggest that 
the MUPP-NP in its current form could indeed be bound for success as it could provide a 
legitimate channel for the demands of its constituency. 
Ecuador's electoral system for the country's legislature, having changed several 
times within the past decade, is the subject of yet another scholarly debate. One has to 
differentiate between the literature written during the electoral system changes and the 
works that evaluated the way elections were held after the entire reform process was 
finished. Pachano's (1998) analysis is centered on a comparison of the Ecuadorian 
electoral system before and after the first round of reforms (including the abolition of 
both the non-reelection rule and midterm elections for congressional deputies elected in 
the provinces). He finds that the new system is rather chaotic, does a poor job at 
recruiting candidates outside of the traditional political elites, and therefore does not 
succeed at representing the interests of the broader spectrum of society. From this 
analysis it could therefore be inferred that the first set of changes to the electoral system 
did not have a positive effect on the level of indigenous representation in the national 
legislature. 
Freidenberg (2003), however, finds the initial changes in the electoral system 
beneficial to the Ecuadorian party system overall, since the voter has more control over 
who gets elected, and deputies now have a chance at establishing a political career, 
possibly making them more eager to please their constituency (in looking at reelection). 
The author acknowledges, however, that the new system creates challenges as well, as it 
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facilitates fragmentation within factions, and has not yielded great changes in party 
structures overall. In regards to the before-mentioned notion, one needs to keep in mind 
that the analysis was made a couple or years after the first set of reforms, and it therefore 
seems natural that effects did not yet seem to be great. 
Acosta (2002), who focuses on the same time period as Pachano, discusses that 
while small electoral districts tend to favor larger parties, the overwhelmingly local 
character of most Ecuadorian parties tends to cancel out this impact. Small parties 
therefore need to concentrate their efforts in small districts to make up for the lack of a 
national electorate. While the author analyzed the electoral system in a different form 
than what it is today, this notion could also hold true in present times since the size of the 
electoral districts has not changed. This then may present one of the obstacles for the 
smaller MUPP-NP in achieving electoral success: small districts are less likely to yield a 
significant number of seats in the National Assembly. On the same note, Taagepera and 
Shugart (1989) assert that under proportional representation, a larger district magnitude 
will yield more proportional results, and that this phenomenon is reversed under plurality. 
In Ecuador, where the electoral system is mixed, representation is proportional to the 
candidate, but disproportional to parties. Since this can affect indigenous parties or 
movements participating in the elections as well, they may experience under-
representation in the Ecuadorian legislature. 
Taagepera and Shugart also explain that a panachage electoral system as the one 
that is currently in place in Ecuador allows a rather high degree of freedom to the voter, 
but the legitimacy of representation achieved under this system is debatable, since a 
party's elected members may be chosen because of the support by voters from other 
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parties. As ACE (2001) found, this can lead to a weakened role of parties and encourage 
personal cult and local followings. The ambition of MUPP-NP of establishing itself 
around a program rather than a leader may be disturbed by the phenomenon discussed 
above, further preventing institutionalization. 
Examining the positive effects of recent electoral system reforms, Lucero (2002) 
and MacDonald (2002) note that the changes have promoted the founding of an 
indigenous political movement in the first place, since until 1996 only candidates 
affiliated with parties were allowed to run for seats in the national legislature. 
My analysis will then add to the existing literature by focusing on the electoral 
system's impact on indigenous party representation in the country's legislative body, the 
National Assembly, over the most recent election cycles (1998 and 2002). I hope to 
show that electoral system factors such as district magnitude, and seat allocation rules, as 
well as related factors such as voter turnout and pre-election registration requirements, 
indigenous literacy, and the size of the indigenous population in each district affect the 
success of indigenous parties in Ecuador. 
Data and Methodology 
I focus my analysis of the Ecuadorian electoral system on the legislative branch of 
government, the National Assembly. This institution is made up of more (100) 
individuals than either the executive or judiciary branches, and its members are elected 
from each of the twenty-two electoral districts in the country. The National Assembly 
therefore provides room for diversity among its members. 
I evaluate the outcomes of the 1998 and 2002 legislative elections to assess 
electoral system influence on indigenous party representation. I choose these most recent 
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elections for two reasons: First, there was no indigenous party or political movement 
outside of an alliance with a traditional faction that succeeded in congressional elections 
prior to the creation of the MUPP-NP in 1996. Second, reforms that lead to the 
Ecuadorian electoral system as we know it today started in 1996, and progressed over the 
following few years, to be fully implemented by the 2002 legislative elections. For this 
reason, rather than focusing on aggregate, national level data only, I compare district 
level data in terms of district magnitude, seat allocation by party, and size of indigenous 
population for the most recent election. I argue that indigenous people will be the ones 
first and foremost interested in the political representation of their interests, therefore 
providing a pool of potential voters for indigenous parties. 
Controlling for the variable of indigenous population size by district proves rather 
difficult, since reliable census data is very difficult to obtain. Furthermore, the 
Ecuadorian census has not differentiated people by ethnicity for over a decade, in an 
effort to further the idea of a unified, Ecuadorian nationality (also called homogenization) 
(Lucero 2002). There is also a dearth of reliable, accessible data on the linguistic make 
up of different regions and districts within Ecuador. The majority of indigenous males 
today are bilingual, putting a limitation on the usefulness of the evaluation oflinguistic 
make-up for population size (Ecuador 2004). I therefore chose to base my 
approximations of indigenous population size on the geographical concentration of 
different indigenous nationalities. The cross-examination of data from different sources, 
including the Consejo de Desarollo de Nacionalidades y Pueblos de Ecuador (a 
governmental institution), CONAIE (MacDonald 2002), Bimir's (2004) estimates and the 
website www.nativeweb.org, helps validate the results. While this measure does not 
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provide the exact number of indigenous people living in each electoral district, I argue 
that it offers a close estimate of native population concentration. 
Table 2.1 shows the Ecuadorian electoral districts ranked in order according to 
estimated percentages of indigenous inhabitants. Based on these estimations, I apply a 
twenty-five percent threshold for the classification of a district as having a large 
indigenous population. I argue that this threshold is meaningful for the following reason: 
The overall indigenous population estimates for Ecuador lie between twenty-five and 
thirty-five percent of the whole population; twenty-five percent therefore serves as a 
liberal reflection of that ratio for each district. If the electoral system then produces 
results that are representative of the make up of the population, these districts should be 
electing a larger proportion of indigenous-party deputies than districts with a lower 
proportion of indigenous inhabitants. 
Electoral results that are examined in this analysis were obtained from a variety of 
governmental, non-governmental, local and international sources, as to ensure their 
validity. The same electoral results and seat assignments to candidates were reported by 
CNN, the Ecuadorian Congress, the MUPP-NP website, and the Base de Datos Politicos 
de las Americas (Georgetown University). The breakdown of deputies per district for the 
2002 elections was obtained from the Ecuadorian Congress only, yet I consider these data 
valid since there is no obvious reason why the names or partisan affiliation of deputies 
currently serving in the legislature should be altered. 
The importance of the effect of the electoral system on party development and 
party system change has been discussed more extensively in the previous chapter. If the 
electoral system in Ecuador promotes indigenous party representation it should be 
47 
reflected in the level of institutionalization and electoral success of indigenous factions. 
The following questions will then be addressed through my analysis: have indigenous 
parties formed? How successful have they been in the two previous legislative elections? 
The electoral system has changed in some significant aspects between the 1998 
and 2002 elections (the total number of deputies has decreased, the method of election 
and seat allocation has changed). A comparison of the number of seats obtained by any 
indigenous factions in either election (a before/after model) will also shed some light on 
the way the electoral system influences indigenous party representation. While the 
results of such an analysis may only suggest the initial effects of electoral system change 
on native political movement representation (since they only cover one election cycle 
after the reforms were put in place), they should at least be indicative of whether the way 
national deputies are elected is beneficial to indigenous party electoral success. 
Furthermore, to measure institutionalization of any indigenous parties, I will 
compare the turnover rate for their deputies in the National Assembly. While a high 
turnover rate may mean that the leadership of the party is constantly adapting and 
evolving to its constituency's needs, it may also mean that the institutionalization of 
candidates is in a regressive state (Freidenberg 2001: 391). I will follow the latter 
proposal in arguing that an effective deputy is generally an experienced one, and that in a 
stable, non-fragmented party environment a deputy would be encouraged by his 
faction/movement to gamer such experience and make use of it in advancing their party 
agenda. 
Finally, I evaluate the question of voter turnout and factors influencing turnout, 
such as literacy and poverty. While it would make sense to include pre-election party 
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registration rules in this section (authors such as Birnir [2004] suggest that this factor 
contributes to the explanation of the lack of indigenous parties in the Andean countries), I 
will refrain from doing so for the following reason. In 1996, the Ecuadorian law was 
changed to allow political movements and independent candidates to run in national 
elections, and the effect of party registration rules (such as the .5% membership quota 
that has to be met in at least ten provinces, including two of the three largest) was 
therefore diminished substantially. Since it is difficult to obtain reliable turnout data 
grouped by ethnic background, or by electoral districts, I will briefly discuss the 
implications of overall turnout levels and its relation with indigenous literacy and 
poverty. 
Results and Discussion 
The semi-proportional, or parallel electoral system in place for the National 
Congress in Ecuador since 2000 uses open party lists. Voters have an "unlimited" vote 
meaning that they can cast as many votes as there are seats allocated to each district 
(district magnitude). The voter has the choice between giving all of his votes to one party 
list or to candidates from separate lists (and separate parties). Each party pools votes for 
individual candidates. Seats are then allocated to the candidates with the largest number 
of votes from the most voted lists. The total number of votes per party is used to 
distribute seats according to the d'Hondt formula. 1 No adjustments are made as to 
compensate for disproportionalities within a district. Ecuadorian voters elect a total of 
100 deputies from 22 districts, also referred to as provinces (ACE Project 2001, EU 
Election Observation Mission 2002, Freidenberg 2001 ). 
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The system used for the 1998 elections was similar to the one explained above, 
yet with some differences: party leaders were not allowed to pool votes for individual 
candidates, and therefore had no control over the distribution of seats within their party. 
Seats were allocated to candidates who received the most votes according to the d'Hondt 
formula, indifferent of how many votes their party received overall. Furthermore, in 
addition to 101 deputies elected from 21 provinces, twenty deputies were elected in one 
single national district (ACE Project 2001, Electoral Observation 1998, Freidenberg 
2001). These differences between the two election systems and their impact on 
indigenous party representation will be considered later in this section. 
Electoral System Characteristics for the National Congress, Ecuador, 1998 and 2002 
1998 2002 
Total number of deputies 121 100 
List type open open 
Vote type Unlimited: number of seats Unlimited: number of seats 
per district, voter can chose per district, voter can chose 
entire party list or entire party list or 
individual candidates across individual candidates across 
parties parties 
Seat allocation Candidates with most votes Parties combine votes for 
receive seats, indifferent of all their candidates, most 
party total (no vote pooling) voted candidates obtain 
seats (vote pooling) 
Allocation formula D'Hondt (not D'Hondt (not 
compensatory) compensatory) 
Electoral Districts 22: one national 22 provincial 
21 provincial 
Average District Magnitude 5.5 4.5 
4.8 without the national 
district 
The indigenous political movement MUPP-NP was able to secure five percent 
(six of 121) congressional seats (Birnir 2004). In 2002 the movement increased its 
number of seats in the legislature to eleven, or eleven percent (Pachakutik 2004, 
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Congreso Ecuadoriano 2004). Data on the overall percentage of votes the movement 
received nationwide is difficult to obtain. While the MUPP-NP is not exclusively 
indigenous in membership and agenda, a great part of its mission is to ameliorate the 
plight of the indigenous people in Ecuador, and allow for their input and share at political 
decision making.2 The MUPP-NP, also known as Pachakutik, is the institution that most 
closely resembles an indigenous party, and therefore presents the primary channel for 
indigenous demands between the national government and the people. As Edmundo 
Vargas, former president of the Confederaci6n de Nacionalidades Indigenas del Amazon 
Ecuador (CONFENAIE), explains the movement " ... we understand perfectly what the 
indigenous struggle is and what the strategy of the state is, so for this very reason we are 
participating in elections as a means ... to construct the plurinational state."(Andolina 
1999: 221) 
The indigenous population in Ecuador started successfully organizing in the 
1980s, when smaller high- and lowland indigenous organizations came together and 
formed CONAIE in an attempt to unite national indigenous economic and political 
concerns. The Sierra, or highland, Indians, for the most part belonging to Quechuan 
nationalities, were mainly concerned with peasant and production issues, where as the 
Amazonian or lowland indigenous' struggle was more of a political nature, pertaining to 
autonomy and sovereignty rights (Lucero 2002). Since CONAIE was initially of anti-
system nature, the movement refused to directly participate in elections until 1995. By 
this time, Amazonian indigenous leaders agreed to form the political movement 
Pachakutik in order to participate in the 1996 national elections. While the native groups 
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in the sierra were not as supportive of this idea, they agreed to back the new movement 
for the sake of unity in the political arena (Andolina 1999). 
The MUPP-NP makes it a point to define itself as a political movement rather 
than a party. For one, the institution wishes to differentiate itself from traditional parties 
that have generally failed to address the concerns of the indigenous and socially 
marginalized sectors of society. Furthermore, it wants to discourage corruption among its 
members that is often fostered by the taking of a centralized direction within an 
institution (Freidenberg 2003). While these reasons make sense at first glance, there are 
positive and negative structural implications that follow the decision to remain at the 
organizational level of a social mass movement. What seems beneficial in terms of 
channeling demands from the constituency to the legislature is that power and authority 
emerge from the base and move to the top. Pachakutik has executive and political 
committees at the county, provincial, and national level, which are responsible for the 
political, fiscal, and legal management of the organization. Candidates for the national 
legislative elections, for example, are selected at the base level, and then advance through 
the provincial to the national level where their candidacy is finalized (Freidenberg 2003). 
In addition, the movement can accommodate new ideas and members from different 
sectors of society with ease, as it possesses moderate fluidity in its direction of action. 
This certainly may make the MUPP-NP attractive to a broader spectrum of 
potential voters, but the lack of a principal course of action may at the same time 
diminish its effectiveness in achieving specific goals, as the process of the realization of a 
goal may be prolonged due to differing opinions about how to get there. Furthermore, 
lowland and highland leaders within the movement frequently clash over the faction's 
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interests and how to pursue them. Internal coherence is one of the prerequisites for 
successful institutionalization of an organization, which in tum provides the values and 
stability that can help a faction survive in its political environment. Furthermore, even if 
the movement gamers an increased number of votes by appealing to more voters, the 
effective translation oflegislative mandates into action may be diminished if the 
organization is not cohesive (Huntington 1968). This phenomenon was observable in the 
1996 to 1998 legislative period, when MUPP-NP had eight candidates elected to the 
national Congress and held 9.76 percent of the seats, but the deputies were not unified 
and therefore did not effectively participate in the political arena (Lucero 2002)3. This 
observation, however, was made at the initial stages of the Pachakutik movement; many 
argue today that the movement has materialized on many characteristics that would 
classify it as a viable party (Andolina 1999, Lucero 2002, Freidenberg 2001). 
At this point I will argue that despite this assertion by different scholars, this 
indigenous movement has not yet institutionalized enough to be labeled as a stable, 
effective organization. In addition to coherence, Huntington (1968) mentions 
adaptability, complexity, and autonomy as characteristics of an institutionalized party that 
would able to channel political participation. While the MUPP-NP seems to satisfy the 
first two requirements, it cannot be seen as an autonomous entity. Both Pachakutik itself 
and other indigenous-based movements such as CONAIE, the Ecuador Runacanapac 
Riccharimui or the Federation of People of Quechua Nationality (ECUARINARI), or 
CONFENAIE have made claims repeatedly that they are independent of one another, and 
that the MUPP-NP does not serve as their political arm. However, representatives from 
those other movements are part of the final decision-making structures within Pachakutik, 
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such as the National Executive Committee and the Political Committee (Freidenberg 
2003). Movement leaders such as former ECUARINARI presidents Salvador Quishpe 
and Ricardo Ulcuango actually serve as deputies for the MUPP-NP in the national 
legislature. I will therefore argue that the Pachakutik movement is a subordinate of other 
indigenous organizations under the leadership of CONAIE, acting according to their 
interests. 
The MUPP-NP has seen a lot of turnover in leaders and deputies since its 
foundation almost a decade ago. This is especially observable between the two most 
recent elections: not a single deputy that was elected to the National Congress in 1998 
was re-elected in 2002. While it could be argued that this is an indication of the ongoing 
self-renewal process that the movement is undergoing in its strive to maintain the identity 
of a political movement rather than a party, it is also a sign of a lack of 
institutionalization. For one, I contend that political actors who are experienced tend to 
be more effective at translating the demands of their constituency into successful policy, 
as they should have a better idea of the mechanisms and dynamics that surround their 
office. Secondly, as a political movement, one of the institution's roles is to educate and 
teach junior members in their roles as representatives of their constituency. It seems 
obvious that senior deputies in Congress could fulfill this function for newly elected 
parliamentarians in the same legislative block, yet no such senior members are available. 
It also seems that with growing incumbency a legislator's chances at reelection increase, 
which could give the movement an advantage in securing more seats and therefore 
influence in Congress. As Freidenberg (2001) notes, the electoral arena in Ecuador is 
saturated with candidates, and people therefore tend to vote for those whom they know. 
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Having dicussed the history and structure of the Pachak:utik movement, I now tum 
to the effects of the electoral system on the MUPP-NP and its electoral success in the 
national legislature. In both 1998 and 2002, voters could cast as many votes as there 
were seats available within their district, and combine them within or across party lists. 
Such a system could encourage political movements, parties, and campaigns to be 
centered around a person rather than an ideology or political agenda, because it may give 
the voter the impression that the candidate is spatially closer to him than the party, since 
he can chose candidate over party. This can give candidates with a strong local identity a 
special edge, even if his party agenda and ideology would not fit with the voter's. 
The event of frequent turnover in the MUPP-NP discussed above could also be 
attributed to this tendency of Ecuadorian political movements and elections to be 
personalistic and locally rather than nationally centered. In order to attract voters, it 
seems inherent that Pachakutik would first and foremost center their election run on 
particular well-known local personalities, especially considering the movement's bottom-
to-top candidacy nomination structure. How is this a problem? 
First of all, it encourages competition within the party. When there are multiple 
candidates running for the MUPP-NP in one province (as there most definitely will be 
since there are at least two seats to contest per district), they will be running against each 
other in an attempt to secure a large enough vote share to ensure a seat in Congress. Only 
the candidates with the highest number of votes within Pachak:utik may be able to accept 
a legislative mandate in Quito. Building on this logic, I then agree with the claim that 
various scholars have made about personalistic, local Ecuadorian factions: they tend to 
encourage fragmentation within an organization (Freidenberg 2001a, Acosta 2002, 
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Pachano 1998). Fragmentation is the opposite of coherence, and can therefore help 
prevent the successful institutionalization of an organization such as the MUPP-NP. 
Secondly, if a voter supports the Pachakutik's agenda, but does not like the candidates the 
party is running, he may decide to give his votes to contenders from other parties whom 
he likes better on a personal level, which in tum would be a loss for the movement 
overall. 
In the 1998 election, intra-party competition resulting from Pachakutik candidates 
running against each other may very well have played a role in the small amount of 
congressional seats the faction was able to obtain (especially considering the large drop 
from holding 10 percent of the total seats in 1996 to just under five in 1998). The 
absence of vote pooling seems to have further exacerbated this problem, as the votes the 
candidates received directly were the only ones that counted. If a faction's votes were 
spread out among candidates with this type of system, the risk that the institution as a 
whole would be underrepresented in the legislature was great. Vote pooling was first 
effectively used in the 2002 elections. This change to the way of allocating seats may 
have been able to curb some of the negative effects of the unlimited vote. While 
competition amongst candidates may still lead to fragmentation within a faction, it could 
be argued that the candidates' votes combined will help the faction's overall chances at 
gaining a seat. Pachakutik was able to gain eleven seats in the 2002 elections, and 
therefore increased its presence in Congress by over 80 percent. 
The unlimited vote and the way of seat allocation also merit another effect of the 
electoral system, especially visible in regards to the MUPP-NP. I argue that by giving 
the voter the freedom to choose between candidates and parties, and introducing the 
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pooling of votes by party, the electoral system encourages electoral alliance formation, 
thereby further diminishing the establishment of a centralized direction of the MUPP-NP. 
My argument is built on the notion that by forming electoral alliances, a movement's or 
party's agenda and campaign have to be attuned to each other. I argue that to appeal to 
the voters of two or three different movements a party's agenda has to be amalgamated 
with some of the other factions' ideas, and may therefore be stirred away from its initial 
path. If Pachakutik's focus, for example, was on advancing a mostly indigenous demand 
such as bilingual education, an alliance with a socialist party like PSP may appeal to the 
MUPP-NP's socialist sector, and help gamer ''otes for Pachakutik from supporters of the 
PSP. In the end, however, the responsibility of a deputy elected from such an alliance 
would be less to the indigenous sector of the Indian movement striving to realize 
bilingual education than to the socialist division that can be found within both 
movements, striving for example for redistribution of revenues and more government 
involvement in the economic sector. I am not arguing that this would be against 
indigenous demands, rather I am trying to content that the initially within Pachakutik 
more prevalent Indian demands will be put on the "back burner" (I will refer to this as the 
"mixing effect" from here on out). 
While MUPP-NP started out at the ideological center, it moved towards the left 
during its development. Today, the movement almost explicitly aligns itself with the 
leftist socialist sector (except for the 1998 alliance with the right-wing Democracia 
Popular in the province Pastaza). Most of the leftist parties share the same ideas: they are 
against neo-liberal economic policies, they want a social democracy (a social "safety 
net"), more equality for the lower sectors of society (redistribution), and they want to end 
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political corruption (Freidenberg 2003). Pachakutik repeatedly stresses that it is different 
from the traditional left parties in that it strives for unity in diversity rather than 
separatism (Pachakutik 2004). However, by forming electoral alliances with the other 
leftist factions, the message the indigenous movement sends out is one of similarity with 
those other factions, rather than one of presenting an alternative to them. 
In 1998, Pachakutik won the majority (or 66 percent) of its seats on lists 
pertaining only to its movement. By 2002, only 45 percent of seats were won on such 
lists (see Table 2.2). All new seats won in districts where no seats were previously held 
were won within a new electoral alliance. Only in Zamora Chinchipe part of the 1998 
alliance remained intact (MUPP-NP/PS-FA), and here the exit of the traditional party 
Izquierda Democratica actually seems to have propelled a 26 percent and 2-seat gain for 
the alliance. This is the largest vote increase for the MUPP-NP in all electoral districts, 
potentially signaling that Pachakutik voters here prefer a course away from traditional 
parties. 
Looking at the overall picture, Zamora Chinchipe does not appear to be an outlier. 
In the majority of districts, votes for the MUPP-NP (when within an alliance) increased 
by less than fifteen percent in 2002. In three of these four cases (Azuay, Chimborazo, 
and Pichincha), Pachakutik aligned itself with the more contemporary Partido Sociedad 
Patri6tica 21 de Enero (PSP) rather than a more traditional party. Within districts where 
the MUPP-NP was able to win seats on their exclusive party list, vote percentages 
remained relatively stable, winning or losing about five percentage points. This may tell 
us a couple of things: First of all, it could mean that the gains in the "alliance districts" 
may have been caused by the supporters of the non-Pachakutik alliance partner, based on 
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the idea that ifthe MUPP-NP thought it would have been able to gain sufficient votes on 
its own it would have ran its own list. Once again, the "mixing effect" of priorities 
discussed above comes into play. The broader a movement "fans out", the less it is going 
to be able to focus on a particular sector's demands. Second, it could mean that in its 
drive for a truly plurinational image the indigenous movement aligns itself with the party 
that comes closest to its own ideals, and can bring out the vote in a district. The PSP, for 
example, while classifying itself as a party, calls for a more socialist, plurinational state 
like the MUPP-NP does, and is a rather modem movement. Part of its name is the "21 st 
of January" which refers to the indigenous-backed uprising in January of2000 that 
ousted President Mahuad (Macdonald 2002, PSP 2004). This may show that the two 
factions have ideological similarities, and that working together can help the gain of more 
congressional seats that could ultimately be translated into a larger influence over 
legislation. The PSP, however, seems somewhat more radical and reformist than 
Pachakutik, and an alliance like this can affect the peaceful, intra-system approach the 
MUPP-NP has pursued throughout its history. 
Overall, then, when we look at Pachakutik as being the political advocate of the 
mostly indigenous, and at the leftist parties as being the advocate of the lower classes in 
society overall, we should not over-value the gain the indigenous have made in their 
representation in Congress. If we count only the seats that Pachakutik won on its own 
(and therefore make it responsible to only its own constituency), the difference between 
1998 and 2002 is merely one seat (see Table 2.2). Consequently the introduction of vote 
pooling may have had a slight positive effect on indigenous electoral success, but that 
while the overall seat count for the MUPP-NP and some of it electoral alliances has 
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increased substantially, the channels for primarily indigenous demands have not 
increased at the same level. 
In considering the make up of electoral districts in relation to votes for 
indigenous representatives, it is quite noticeable that the majority of seats were won in 
districts classified as having a large indigenous population (see Table 2.2.), which seems 
natural given the fact that the indigenous would be the ones caring about their own 
demands. Only in Pastaza and Tungurahua no member of the MUPP-NP was successful. 
While we can treat Tungurahua as an outlier, since population dynamics here are very 
close to the 25 percent threshold, the result for Pastaza is quite surprising since the 
province is home to the second largest share of indigenous people in the whole country 
(47 percent). In looking at Table 2.2, it becomes obvious that the MUPP-NP ran with the 
center-left Democracia Popular (DP) in 1998, and was able to gain a seat then, yet ran on 
its own in 2002. This may have two possible implications: First, Pachakutik may not 
have succeed in 2002 partially because it lost its DP supporters. Or second, the MUPP-
NP did not succeed because it was associated with DP in the last elections, and DP has 
lost its popularity in Pastaza. Both of these situations show the negative effects that 
alliance formation for gaining seats can have. In such a setting, partners are always 
dependent on the level of support the other has. Looking at the election results, it seems 
the second scenario is more likely the case. The DP did not secure any seats in Pastaza in 
2002 (Congreso Nacional del Ecuador, 2004). Pachakutik, then, may have lost its chances 
for a seat because it was associated with what caused the support for DP to decline. The 
tendency of the electoral system to encourage alliances may then in actuality play out 
negatively in respect to MUPP-NP success. 
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A great example for the disadvantages that alliance formation and dependence 
bears for the indigenous community can be found in the break-up of the governing 
coalition of Ecuador in August of 2003. The PSP, party of President Lucio Gutierrez, 
who was elected with Pachakutik support, evicted the MUPP-NP from the ruling 
coalition in Congress because most of its legislators had voted against a presidential civil 
service reform proposal (Taylor 2003). The movement, as the representative of the 
indigenous population, was ousted because the indigenous interest in blocking the reform 
collided with its alliance partner's interest to pursue the restructuring of the civil service. 
While the alliance then initially gave Pachakutik a position from where it could directly 
influence the country's policy, the practical exercise of that influence was limited. 
Alliance formation, then, as illustrated above, could increase a faction's dependence on 
the other partner and therefore limit the range of policy interests the former can support 
for its constituency. 
The districts of Sucumbios, Pichincha, and Zamora Chinchipe, which have a 
relatively small share of the indigenous population (twelve, ten, and three percent, 
respectively), all elected congressional representatives from Pachakutik in 2002 (see 
Table 2.3). In all three districts, the indigenous movement ran in alliance with other 
parties, which may be one of the factors that helped them gain seats. The notion that 
alliances will not serve the realization of indigenous demands as well as "pure" MUPP-
NP mandates could be applied here. Since these three districts have a proportionally 
small number of indigenous inhabitants, it seems natural that Indian demands would only 
appeal to the majority in the sense that they may include ideas common to a variety of 
social classes. The indigenous may therefore have gained representation for these 
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demands, but not for the ones that pertain directly to them. Other factors that may have 
helped the MUPP-NP and its alliance partners is that in Pichincha and Sucumbios votes 
were very fragmented and split up between a large number of candidates. Since a large 
number of their joint candidates received a small amount of votes each, the sum as a 
whole ensured them a seat. 
Another variable known to affect representation is district magnitude (Cox 1997, 
Taagepera and Shugart 1989). The average district magnitude (adm) in the different 
provincial districts in Ecuador seems to have changed moderately between the 1998 and 
2002 legislative elections (from 5.5 to 4.5). This can largely be attributed to the abolition 
of the large national district, as the majority of provincial districts have maintained the 
same number of representatives. When comparing the adm for 1998 without the national 
district with the adm for 2002 ( 4.8 versus 4.5, respectively), the results show that adm has 
only slightly decreased in the most recent election. Should this have an effect on the 
political success of indigenous factions? 
Initially, one may suggest that it might have a slightly positive effect on 
indigenous party representation, since a substantially higher number ofMUPP-NP 
members were elected to the Congress in 2002. However, smaller district magnitude is 
generally thought to have a negative effect on small party success (Taagepera and 
Shugart 1989, Cox 1997). This does not seem to be the case in Ecuador: Table 2.2 shows 
that the district magnitude remained the same in almost all the provinces where 
Pachakutik deputies gained seats. In two provinces, Morona Santiago and Sucumbios, the 
indigenous movement was even able to gain a seat despite a decline in district magnitude 
(see Table 2.2.). 
62 
One explanation for this could be, as Acosta (2002) argues, that the local 
character of the Pachakutik movement (and Ecuadorian parties in general) annuls the 
negative impact of small districts. The movement also may have been able to better 
mobilize the indigenous voters in 2002 since it has had a greater time span to do so (after 
its formation in 1996 it had two years to campaign before the next election vs. having 
four years between 1998 and 2002). As discussed above, alliance formation may have 
very well influenced this outcome as well. Overall, every one of the districts here 
classified as having large indigenous populations is rather small in size, with the largest 
district magnitude being four. Furthermore, most provinces where the Pachakutik 
movement was not successful (exceptions here are the large provinces of Guayas, 
Pichincha, and Manabi) have a district size comparable to that of the districts where the 
MUPP-NP was able to gamer seats. I will then argue that taken as a whole, district 
magnitude does not seem to have a significant influence over the success of indigenous 
parties in Ecuador, since a large increase in indigenous party seats was observed despite 
minimal changes to the size of electoral districts. 
Table 2.3 reveals another interesting observation. In the majority of districts, the 
percentage of the vote cast for the indigenous movement was significantly lower than the 
percentage of the indigenous population. I cannot assume that all indigenous voters will 
cast their vote for Pachakutik, however there may be other factors relevant here than 
simply voter choice. Voting in Ecuador is mandatory for people between eighteen and 65 
years of age, and voluntary for people older than that and the illiterate (Electoral 
Observation 1998). Despite the obligatory vote, large rates of defection and invalid votes 
have been observed. While I do not have access to district level data, recent studies have 
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shown that literacy rates among the indigenous are much lower than among other ethnic 
groups (UNICEF 2004, Committee 2003, Proyecto Condor 2004, Freidenberg 2001). 
Illiteracy could have effects on indigenous voter turnout, and therefore indigenous party 
success, for the following reasons: Since voting is not mandatory for illiterates, it is very 
likely that fewer of them would vote than if a penalty would threaten them in case they 
do not. Secondly, illiterates would have a more difficult time deciphering ballots, and 
gathering information about candidates. Thirdly, illiteracy is often tied to poverty, and 
poverty is often tied to low voter turnout, since people that are struggling economically 
are generally more concerned with survival than political participation (Rosenstone 
1982). Indigenous illiteracy could therefore be considered a disadvantage in the 
realization of Pachakutik success, simply because it may keep potential supporters away 
from the poles. And low voter turnout in a system where votes count individually can be 
detrimental to a faction's success, if a great part of those who do not participate 
politically belong to that faction's pool oflikely supporters. 
Conclusions 
The results of this analysis suggest that the parallel PR electoral system in 
Ecuador may have negative effects on indigenous representation in the national 
legislature. The independent vote seems to encourage the personalistic character of 
political factions, thus encouraging competition amongst leaders within the institution, 
potentially leading to fragmentation. This apparent lack of coherence along with little 
autonomy and a high turnover rate for legislators within the MUPP-NP have lead me to 
conclude that the level of institutionalization within this movement is low. While the 
introduction of vote pooling in the 2002 elections seemed to dampen the effect of 
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competition among intra-faction elites in elections, conflict between lowland and 
highland sectors of the movement persist, still threatening fragmentation and therefore 
potentially inhibiting further institutionalization. This may then lessen the ability of 
Pachakutik to efficiently communicate and realize indigenous participation in the national 
Congress, as institutionalization is an important factor in determining party viability and 
effectiveness. 
Vote pooling also seems to encourage alliance formation, which may have helped 
Pachakutik gain seats in the legislature, particularly in 2002. This apparently positive 
effect on indigenous representation in Congress is quickly neutralized when one 
considers the increasing dependence between the factions involved in an alliance, which 
in turn could affect what issues the alliance focuses on, potentially neglecting pressing 
indigenous demands. 
District magnitude, against expectations, does not seem to play a large role in the 
determination of the level of indigenous representation in Ecuador. Against common 
assertions, the small Pachakutik movement was able to garner the majority of its votes in 
small districts, and gain seats in the legislature despite a small decrease in average district 
magnitude. 
Ecuador's Indians are counted among the best organized and politically involved 
in South America. While this analysis did not serve to counter this fact, it should be seen 
as a reminder that true multiculturalism is still a ways away. As the traditionally 
marginalized indigenous move towards greater inclusion into the decision-making 
processes in their country, institutional factors such as the electoral system can become 
obstacles on the way to achieving political representation. The consideration of such 
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factors should be helpful when designing policy alternatives that could remove such 
obstacles. 
1 This formula uses successive divisors. For more detailed information see Taagepera, Rein, and Matthew 
Soberg Shugart. 1989. Seats and Votes: The Effects and Determinants of Electoral Systems. New Haven: 
Yale University Press: p. 32. 
2 Besides indigenous interest groups (such as CONAIE, ECUARUNARI, COFENAIE etc.) and other 
indigenous members, the Pachakutik movement also includes participants from the public sector (i.e. oil 
and electricity), social movements, religious groups, leftists, and intellectuals. For further information, see 
Freidenberg, Flavia. 2001. "Movimiento Unidad Plurinacional Pachakutik- Nuevo Pais". In Manuel 
Alcantara Saez y Flavia Freidenberg, eds. Partidos Politicos de America Latina: Paises Andinos. 
Salamanca, Spain: Universidad de Salamanca. 
3 At the time, each deputy in the Pachakutik block was going his or her own way. See Lucero, Antonio. 
2002. Arts of Unification: Political Representation and Indigenous Movements in Bolivia and Ecuador. 
Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton University, 101-103. 
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Table 2.1: Indigenous Population per Electoral District, Ecuador 
p . T I p ** o/c I d p ***R nk D p I 982 D p I 23 rovmce ota op o n .. a . . . . 0 
Azuay 599,546 6 5 5 1 
Bolivar* 169,370 29 4 3 1 3 1 
Cafiar 206,981 18 3 3 
Carchi 152,939 0 3 3 
Chimborazo* 403,632 50 1 4 4 1 
Cotopaxi* 349,540 28 5 3 1 4 1 
El Oro 525,763 0 5 4 
Esmeraldas 403,632 1 4 4 
Galapagos 18,640 0 2 2 
Guayas 3,309,034 5 18 18 
Imbabura* 344,044 40 3 3 1 3 1 
Loja 404,835 5 4 4 
Los Rios 650,178 0 5 5 
Mana bi 1,186,025 5 8 8 
Morona 115,412 26 6 3 (1) 2 1 
Santiago* 
Napo* 79,139 25 7 3 1 2 1 
Orellana 86,493 19 - 2 
Pastaza* 61,779 47 2 2 (1) 2 
Pi chin cha 2,288,817 10 14 14 1 
Sucumbios 128,995 12 3 2 1 
Tungurahua* 441,034 26 6 4 4 
Zamora 76,601 3 2 2 2 
Chinchipe 
Totals 101 4(6) 100 11 
*Districts with a high concentration of indigenous people. 
**This data is derived from the Ecuadorian Census in 2001. See the Instituto Nacional de 
Estadistica y Censos. htm://w\vw.iqec.gov.ec 
***Percentage of indigenous population compared to overall population in the district. 
1: Number of provincial deputies in the National Assembly for the district, 1998/2002. 
2: Number of provincial deputies from the MUPP-NP indigenous movement elected in 
that district during the 1998 legislative elections. Two additional deputies from the 
MUPP-NP indigenous movement were elected in a single national district in 1998. 
3: Number of provincial deputies from the MUPP-NP indigenous movement elected in 
that district during the 2002 legislative elections. 
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Table 2.2: National MUPP-NP Deputies Electoral Lists, by Province, Ecuador 
Province 1998 MUPP* Alliance** 2002 MUPP* Alliance** 
Azuay 1 
Bolivar 1 '1 1 '1 
Cotopaxi 1 ~ 1 '1 
Chimborazo 1 
Imbabura 1 MUPP/PS-F A/MCNP 1 '1 
Morona 1 '1 1 '1 
Santiago 
Napo 1 '1 1 '1 





MUPP: Movimiento Unidad Plurinacional Pachakutik - Nuevo Pais 
PS-FA: Partido Socialista Ecuartoriano - Frente Amplio 
MCNP: Movimiento Ciudadanos Nuevo Pais 
DP: Democracia Popular 
PSP: Partido Sociedad Patriotica 21 de Enero 








Table 2.3: Vote for MUPP-NP Deputies by province, 1998 and 2002, Ecuador 
Province % Ind. 98% Elected Alliance 02 % Elected Alliance 
Azuay 5.9 18.3 MUPP/PS-F A/ID 11.1 '1 MUPP/PSP 
Bolivar 28.4 19.0 '1 none 15.3 '1 none 
Cotopaxi 27.9 9.3 --./ none 14.9 '1 none 
Chimborazo 49.3 7.6 MUPP/PS-FA 22.8 --./ MUPP/PSP 
Imbabura 39.6 16.1 '1 MUPP/PS-F A/MCNP 16.8 --./ none 
Morona Santiago 25.5 27.8 '1 none 23.0 --./ none 
Napo 24.5 24.5 '1 none 21.9 --./ none 
Pastaza 46.9 24.4 '1 MUPP/DP 15.75 none 
Pichincha 9.4 10.6 MUPP/PS-FA/MCNP 11.8 --./ MUPP/PSP 
Sucumbios 11.7 0 14.55 '1 MUPP/MCNP 
Zamora Chinchipe 2.7 10.6 MUPP /PS-FA/ID 36.85 -'1'1 MUPPIPS-FA 
Source 98 %: Beck, Scott, and Kenneth Mijeski.2001. "Barricades and Ballots: Ecuador's Indians and the 
Pachakutik Political Movement." Ecuadorian Studies/Estudios ecuatorianos 1 (Sept.). 
Source 02 %: TSE (Tribunal Supremo Electoral), 2004. 
MUPP: Movimiento Unidad Plurinacional Pachakutik - Nuevo Pais 
PS-FA: Partido Socialista Ecuartoriano - Frente Amplio 
ID: Izquierda Democratica 
MCNP: Movimiento Ciudadanos Nuevo Pais 
DP: Democracia Popular 
PSP: Partido Sociedad Patri6tica 21 de Enero 
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CHAPTER 3: List-PR Electoral Systems and the Lack of Indigenous 
Representation: The Outlier Peru 
Introduction 
Peru is the Andean country with the largest indigenous population in absolute 
terms. Proportionally, a majority of the overall inhabitants are of indigenous origin 
(estimates range from 40 to 45 percent). However, the native people in this country have 
faced discrimination and injustice as the indigenous in Bolivia, Ecuador, and elsewhere; 
but they also have been, until this day, almost entirely excluded from the political 
processes in the country. No indigenous movement has yet developed at the national 
level; indigenous municipal and provincial electoral successes are minimal compared to 
the other nations in this study. The country's political and judicial systems have been 
plagued with corruption, trust in governmental institutions and political parties is very 
low (Schmidt 2004). Most recently, Cirilo Robles, the elected mayor ofLlave, a small 
town in the Peruvian highlands, was attacked and lynched by the town's people for 
corruption. The mayor himself, as well as the majority of the attackers, was of indigenous 
decent (Shifter 2004). This is an example of the lack of legitimate, functioning channels 
within the political system to address fraud and resolve disputes, particularly for 
indigenous people that have yet to gain access to the main lawmaking and governing 
bodies. 
While many factors may have played a role in the development of this situation, I 
will look at the national electoral system in this analysis. I hypothesize that the Peruvian 
open-list Proportional Representation (PR) electoral system has helped prevent 
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indigenous political representation at the national level, by discouraging the evolution of 
indigenous movements and parties, as well as by giving the non-indigenous population 
concentrated in the coastal region an electoral advantage over the indigenous voters in the 
high- and lowland districts. 
The dependent variable is political representation. In the previous two chapters, I 
have attempted to measure representation in terms of the number of deputies elected to 
the legislature, as well as in terms of their functionality at representing indigenous 
interests. In the Peruvian case, I will not be able to apply this latter question of how well 
deputies channel indigenous demands, since no members of native factions have been 
elected to the national legislature. 
Rather, I will look at the influence that the national electoral system (the main 
independent variable) potentially had on the lack of indigenous movement evolution in 
the past, as well as the impact it may have on the formation and institutionalization of 
future indigenous factions. I specifically look at the Double Optional Preferential Vote, 
seat allocation, and district magnitude. Furthermore, I consider the regional electoral 
system as well as voter turnout in the latest national and regional elections, as these 
factors may indicate the potential of future development of stable, institutionalized 
indigenous factions, as the latter tend to commence their development at the local level, 
as we have witnessed in the cases of Bolivia and Ecuador. 
Debates in the Literature 
There is a general theme in the literature concerning Peruvian indigenous peoples: 
the country is home to the least developed and least successful indigenous movements in 
the Andean region (Van Cott 2003a, 2004; Schmidt 2004a, Dean 2002). This may be an 
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implication why indigenous success at gaining representation at the national level has 
been virtually non-existent to this day, especially as we have witnessed the formation of 
indigenous parties out of movements in neighboring countries such as Ecuador and 
Bolivia. 
It seems that, overall, political institutions (particularly parties) in Peru have been 
weak, unstable, and undeveloped throughout the country's recent history, which in turn 
has contributed to political volatility (Mainwaring and Scully 1995, Payne et al. 2002, 
Schmidt 2004a). The same can be said about mobilization and civil society at the 
national level, particularly in regards to indigenous peoples. A number of authors have 
looked at different factors such as the political history and geopolitical as well as socio-
economic characteristics of the country, in search of the roots of this condition. I will 
discuss a number of their findings in the following section. 
Peru is geographically divided into coastal, highland (Sierra) and lowland 
(Amazonian) areas. While the coastal region only spreads out over one tenth of the total 
territory, it is home to half of the country's population. Traditionally, elites have settled 
in this area in and around the capital Lima, the center of politics and economics. About 
one third of the country's population live in the highland areas, and one seventh in the 
Amazon, the two regions where the majority of indigenous people is at home. The 
cultural and economic differences between the three areas are rather pronounced; the 
latter two regions are considered backwards and underdeveloped. The distant location of 
Peru's capital from the highland and lowland reinforces the idea of separation, and has 
made large-scale mobilization of the indigenous more difficult, since their access to the 
center of politics is limited (Gelles 2002). 
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Great differences can also be found between the highland and lowland indigenous 
peoples, not only in terms of population size, tradition, and language, but also in terms of 
how they live together. Most indigenous living in the sierra are campesinos, or peasants, 
and are part of extensive peasant communities. Amazonian indigenous are home in the 
jungle, the majority living in very traditional, native, if not primitive societies. 
Amazonian natives belong to a diverse number of tribes that are rather isolated, 
where the highlanders are mostly of Quechua and Aymara origin (Gelles 2002). These 
disparities have encouraged a mood of isolation and fragmentation between the different 
indigenous groups, rather than fostering a feeling of community. The profound 
regionalism is also reflected in the indigenous organizations that do exist, such as the 
Asociaci6n Interetnica de Desarrollo de la Selva Peruana (AIDESEP) and the 
Confederaci6n de Nacionalidades Amaz6nicas del Peru (CONAP). Both organizations 
are based in the Amazon, share common interests, but are competing with each other 
rather than working together (Dean 2002). It is not surprising, then, that indigenous 
movements and organizations who rival each other do not seem to be able to reach 
beyond the local level, be it within or outside of the political system. As Schmidt (2004a, 
66) observes: " ... civil society among the poor is dense but disarticulated and largely 
incapable of pursuing collective goals beyond the local level on a sustained basis." This 
is not to argue that indigenous should shed the way they define themselves, rather that it 
may be more beneficial for the advancement of their common interests to combine rather 
than rival each other's political voice and capabilities. 
Another factor often discussed in the literature with regards to the lack of national 
indigenous political mobilization in Peru is the "reign" of President Fujimori from 1990 
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to 2000. While his administration did create a couple of offices concerned with 
indigenous affairs and laid a foundation for the potential future concession of Indian 
rights, they did not achieve much in terms of indigenous advocacy under his rule. 1 
Furthermore, Fujimori's neo-liberal approach to economic development turned out to be 
detrimental to indigenous peoples. This happened particularly in the Amazon where the 
extraction of natural resources (i.e. oil, natural gas) helped split up indigenous lands and 
furthered the destruction of their environment (Dean 2002). This may then have added to 
the lack of consolidation between indigenous peoples i.e. in the Amazon region, since it 
exacerbated their groups' isolation from one another; and further undermined their trust 
in political institutions as they continued to fail them. 
This last point is also discussed by Schmidt (2004a), who finds that Fujimori's 
dissolution, ridicule, and re-establishment of Congress as a rubber-stamp institution sent 
out the message that public institutions such as legislatures and parties cannot be 
confided in. The former president gave some money to the poor indigenous in exchange 
for support, but failed to help the creation of intra-systemic channels for the 
representation and communication of indigenous demands (Dean 2002, Schmidt 2004a). 
Fujimori 's governance then may have hindered the development of stronger mobilization 
and civil society amongst indigenous peoples by weakening their ties with each other, 
confirming their low trust in political institutions, and giving them extra-systemic 
incentives rather than supporting intra-systemic development of political channels for 
demand aggregation and redistribution. 
Sendero Luminoso (SL), or the Shining Path movement, which was spreading 
political violence throughout Peru for well over a decade after 1980, has also been 
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credited with further contributing to a low level of indigenous mobilization by a variety 
of authors. Tens of thousands of people died during the active period of SL, many of 
them indigenous (Schmidt 2004a). The guerillas were particularly active in the tropical 
Andes and the Amazon, both heavily populated by indigenous people, who were 
automatically drawn into the conflict, forced to pick sides (Dean 2002). The Peruvian 
government soon launched a counterattack against SL, which included the militarization 
of the "rondas campesinas", which were peasant self-defense groups that evolved in the 
late 1970s (Dean 2002, Schmidt 2004a, Fajardo 2002). These groups were initially the 
most dynamic peasant movement in the 1980s, playing a great role in conflict mediation 
and addressing problems that were ignored by the national government (Fajardo 2002). 
They were potentially providing the base for a greater peasant mobilization in the future, 
which did not become a reality due to the counterinsurgency effort. As Fajardo (2002) 
notes, the attempt to reconstruct a peasant movement would be a drawn-out process, 
particularly under the conditions of poverty and military control. 
Moreover, other authors look for reasons more within the structure of Peruvian 
politics and society. Degregori (1999), for example, argues that the term "indio" has a 
negative connotation historically, and is used for the poor strata of society (indigenous, 
slaves, poor farmers). No one today wants to be identified as an "indio", which has 
helped prevent the evolution of social movements based on ethnicity. Furthermore, also 
making ethnically-based mobilization less likely, highland indigenous are identified by 
their social-economic status as peasants rather than by their ethnicity (Gelles 2002). 
Finally, the style of indigenous politics itself may be a decisive factor as well. 
Broad consensus at the community level rather than detached, centralized, authoritarian 
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politics should be the political ideals to follow (Morin and Saladin d' Anglure 1997). The 
problem with today's pan-ethnic politics, according to Dean and Levi (2003), Kearney 
(1996), and Smith (1996), is their personalized orientation and top-down approach, 
without much regard for grass-root activism. As we have observed in Bolivia and 
Ecuador, successful indigenous movements and parties are generally built from the 
bottom up. 
There are a number of authors that evaluate parts of the Peruvian electoral system 
in its past and present format, yet not in terms of its effect on indigenous factions. 
Schmidt (2004), for example, argues that the way candidates are chosen by the voters 
(Double Optional Preferential Vote or DOPV) encourages competition and therefore 
fragmentation within parties. According to the author, the DOPV is an error prone and 
fraud-prone process, since electoral authorities do not watch it as closely. Katz (1980) 
adds that political parties, when intra-party choice is allowed, as is the case under DOPV, 
tend to be rather disunited and personalistic. Local elections have also received some 
attention: Andrianzen et al. (2002) analyze the outcome of the 2002 regional election and 
found that parties are polarized, and political representation is fragmented. Independent 
candidates won a good part of the Sierra, and many candidates were elected with a low 
percentage of the vote (around 30 percent), making their credibility questionable. In 
essence, the main message this seems to convey is that voters are not satisfied with the 
way things are, yet are not sure which direction they want to change to. At the very least, 
absenteeism at these regional elections was relatively low at fifteen percent (Andrianzen 
et al. 2002), potentially demonstrating that Peruvians want to participate in their political 
processes. 
76 
I hope to add to the existing scholarship by looking at the potential relationship of 
the electoral system to the lack of indigenous factions and political representation in Peru. 
Data and Methodology 
In my analysis, I consider the electoral system for the legislative branch of 
government, the national Congress. Made up of 130 members from all regions of the 
country, this institution should theoretically provide the most space for the articulation of 
diverse interests at the national level. 
In contrast with the previous two cases (Bolivia and Ecuador), no indigenous 
movement or political organization has been successful at national level elections in Peru. 
However, the nature of the electoral system may have contributed to this situation. I will 
therefore consider the two most recent elections in 2000 and 2001, and evaluate the 
theoretical implications of the electoral systems used in both years. A comparison of 
factors such as district magnitude, list type, vote type, seat allocation and seat allocation 
formula should shed some light on the potentially positive or negative effects the 
electoral system could bear on indigenous party formation and success. I chose the 2000 
and 2001 elections since they were the most recent national-level elections. One may 
argue that the 2000 elections may have been undermined by fraud since Fujimori ran for 
an unconstitutional third term in the simultaneously occurring presidential elections, and 
this could potentially have skewed results in the legislature as well. However, I am not 
looking at the presidential elections in this analysis, and legislative elections were held in 
a constitutional manner. Furthermore, it would not make sense to compare the latest 
election in 2001 with an election that was not its immediate predecessor, as to note the 
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latest changes in the electoral system, and the most contemporary trends in regards to 
indigenous political representation. 
To make this analysis more realistic and far-reaching, I will also look at the 
electoral system used in the 2002 regional elections, where indigenous movements indeed 
have had some local success. While I do not have access to data that reveals whether a 
movement or political faction is primarily centered on indigenous identity or ethnicity, 
the electoral system structure itself may imply whether it could foster the development of 
indigenous factions. I will finally consider registration requirements for political 
movements and parties to be eligible to compete in the election, as they can impact the 
ability of an indigenous faction to form and be electorally viable (Bimir forthcoming). 
Electoral results for both the national and regional elections were obtained from a variety 
of sources: the governmental institutions Oficina Nacional de Procesos Electorales 
(ONPE) and Instituto Nacional de Estadistica e Informcitica (INEI), the national 
organization Participa Peru, the Base de Datos Politicos de la Americas, and media 
outlets such as CNN. The same information was obtained from all sources considered, 
giving the results used here more credibility. 
In the two parts of the analysis described above, I will control for the size of the 
indigenous population by district (see Table 3.1). There is no census data available on the 
number of indigenous people in this country, since this characteristic was last used in the 
1940 census. At that time, 46 percent of all Peruvians were classified as indigenous, 
mostly of Quechuan and Aymaran origin (Schmidt, 2004). I will therefore consider 
alternative sources, such as the atlas and database about indigenous populations in the 
Amazon (Brack Egg and Yufioz 1997), data from the Asociaci6n Interetnica de 
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Desarrollo de la Selva Peruana (AIDESEP), and the classification of indigenous districts 
by other scholars such as Binir (2001 ). While it is difficult to determine the exact 
number of indigenous inhabitants of a district, it is also not necessary for this type of 
analysis. Since no representatives of indigenous factions were elected into the national 
Congress, and an undetermined number into regional government, the question of where 
these deputies were not elected is redundant. An approximate indication of where 
indigenous people are concentrated, however, will help in the process of evaluating 
where the potential would be given that indigenous factions could be elected in the 
future. I will define "indigenous districts" as those which are home to a significant 
number of indigenous people according to linguistic groups (in the Amazon I Selva), and 
geographical location (southern and central highlands in the Sierra). 
The differentiation of indigenous versus non-indigenous districts will find 
application in the evaluation of voter turnout at the district level. I will consider voter 
turnout in the national 2000 and 2001 elections, as well as in the regional 2002 elections. 
The prospects of future indigenous party success could be affected by turnout, as voting 
is the critical component for electoral success. I will then argue that if a change in turnout 
can be observed in indigenous districts, it could be an indication of the level of electoral 
support future indigenous factions could receive, as an increase or decrease in overall 
voter turnout per district may be an indicator of the level of political activism, including 
indigenous political activism. The values for turnout are based on district level election 
data from Dr. Gregory Schmidt (2000) and district level data from the ONPE and the 
INEI. I calculated the approximate turnout by dividing the number of actual votes taken 
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(including valid, nulled, and blank ballots) by the number of all registered and eligible 
voters in the district. 
Finally, I will consider factors outside of the electoral system that may have 
contributed to the lack of national level electoral success by indigenous movements and 
parties. Some of these have been addressed more extensively in the literature, as the 
foregoing section has shown. It is important to look at the overall picture to evaluate any 
trends in the development of indigenous political actors. I will then try to discuss the 
potential of indigenous faction formation and electoral success based on the experiences 
of such movements in Bolivia and Ecuador, where they have been more successful. In 
highlighting the differences and similarities between the three countries and their 
movements, I hope to be able to make some projections about the political future of 
indigenous peoples in Peru. 
Results and Discussion 
National Elections 
The electoral systems used in the 2000 and 2001 congressional elections are 
similar in many respects, as can be seen in the following table. The two main similar 
characteristics that need to be considered are the vote type and the way seats are 
allocated, since these two factors have a great impact on who gets a seat in the legislature, 
which ultimately impacts the way candidates within parties relate to each other, in tum 
shaping party structures. The Double Optional Preferential Vote (DOPV) lets the voter 
select two candidates from his chosen list that he would prefer to be given seats in the 
legislature. Each list receives a number of seats proportional to its share of the vote, and 
the preferential votes decide which candidates receive a seat (Schmidt 2004aa). 
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I argue that this way of selecting congressional deputies could have a negative impact on 
the successful formation and institutionalization of political parties, particularly smaller 
ones (future indigenous factions will most likely fit in this category). By being able to 
pick and chose between different candidates within a party, the voter encourages these 
candidates to compete with each other in hopes of attracting enough individual 
preferential votes to get one of the faction's seats (Schmidt 2004a). It therefore fosters 
personalistic, individual-focused voter choice rather than aiming at support for the party 
and its platform as a whole. Political parties therefore tend to be disunited (Katz 1980). 
As we have seen in Bolivia and Ecuador, an environment of rivaling candidates 
within a party is not supportive of the evolution of stable, institutionalized parties. The 
opposite is true: competition rather than cohesion within a party may even lead to the 
splintering away of leaders to pursue their personal political goals, further weakening a 
party's internal structure and support base. The characteristic of proportional 
representation (PR) systems to encourage many small factions to compete in an election 
furthers the fragmenting effects of DOPV, since it promises possible electoral success to 
those who split away, rather than forcing them to consolidate their differences within one 
faction if they hope to attain any seats. 
It is difficult to estimate the actual impact of the DOPV on non-indigenous parties 
that ran in the 2000 and 2001 elections, because of the circumstances that surrounded the 
two races.2 I will content, however, based on the theoretical implications explained 
above, that if indigenous political movements would participate in future congressional 
elections, they would most likely also be affected by the fragmenting effects the DOPV 
can have on parties. Furthermore, I argue that this fragmentation and the access even very 
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small parties have to the political field could impede a future indigenous political 
movement's ability to represent indigenous demands in Congress: if cohesion within such 
an indigenous movement is less likely, their numbers of seats will most likely be too 
small to have any impact on decision making in Congress, due to splintering within their 
faction. Finally, how likely are candidates to work together that rival each other for 
preferential votes? Based on the assumptions explained above, I argue not very likely. 
On a related note, the DOPV seems to be more susceptible to fraud: election 
authorities do not watch the allocation of seats within parties as closely; this is the 
parties' responsibility (Schmidt 2004). Some factions may then chose someone different 
to receive a seat than what the voters indicated through their preferential vote. Also, 
studies have shown that poorer voters are less likely to use DOPV (meaning they will not 
indicate a preference), and when they do they are more error-prone (Schmidt 2004). This 
could potentially have a negative effect on indigenous voters since they generally belong 
to the poorest strata of society, and are therefore more likely to make mistakes filling out 
their ballots, leaving a higher number of the latter ones invalid and therefore unable to 
influence the electoral outcome. 
After considering some of the similar characteristics of the 2000 and 2001 
electoral systems, I will now tum to the most striking difference between them: district 
numbers and magnitudes. The 2000 elections were held in a single national district, 
where in 2001 deputies were elected in 25 multi-member districts with district 
magnitudes varying from one to 35. The general argument in the social sciences is that 
the larger the district magnitude in a PR system, the more proportional the results will be. 
(Katz 1980, Taagepera and Shugart 1989). 
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Electoral Systems National Congress Peru: 2000 and 2001 
2000 2001 
Total number of deputies 120 120 
List type open open 
Vote type Double Optional DOPV 
Preferential Vote (DOPV): 
in addition to selecting a 
list, voter can also select 
two preferential candidates 
on the list (do not have to 
be ordinal) 
Seat allocation Each list is awarded seats in Each list is awarded seats in 
proportion to its share of proportion to its share of 
votes, specific candidates votes, specific candidates 
are elected by preferential are elected by preferential 
votes votes 
Allocation formula D'Hondt D'Hondt 
Electoral Districts 1 25 
Average District Maimitude 120 4.84 (3.44)* 
*The district of Lima presents an outlier with a district magnitude ( dm) of 35 (the next 
highest dm is 7); the value in parenthesis therefore shows the average district magnitude 
without Lima. 
Sources: Schmidt 2004a; Congreso Peruana (http://www.congreso.gob.pe) 
Based on this assumption, one may argue that under the 2000 electoral system, 
small indigenous movements would have had a better chance at gaining seats. However, 
we also need to consider the impact such a district magnitude could have on the 
formation and viability of such factions, which logically have to precede their electoral 
success (a faction cannot be elected if it is not formed or viable, meaning able to garner a 
substantial number of votes). A very large district magnitude theoretically allows for 
many small factions to enter the political stage. This then, combined with the fragmenting 
effects ofDOPV, further discourages the consolidation, institutionalization, and internal 
cohesiveness small parties need to obtain enough votes to secure seats in the legislature. 
One may argue that thanks to such a large district magnitude, regionally concentrated 
minorities (such as different indigenous tribes) could gain access to representation in the 
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legislature. However, registration requirements for parties and movements in the 2000 
elections may dampen this argument in that inscription in the national election authority 
required the signature of at least 4 percent of the national electorate, and by 2000 
Fujimori had raised this standard to almost 500,000 people (Schmidt 2004a, Lopez 2000). 
Considering, for example, that the total of indigenous peoples in the Amazon region is 
only about 250,000, Amazonian Indians could not get to this number by themselves. The 
highland indigenous, as I will discuss later on, are much more numerous, yet organized 
along class lines and very much separate from the Amazonian indigenous; help from the 
highlanders therefore could not be expected. Based on these notions, it seems that the 
large national district encouraged internal party fragmentation, and along with inflated 
party registration requirements denied smaller parties with a geographically concentrated 
constituency the chance to succeed in national elections. Indigenous movements, if they 
existed at the time, would have faced the challenges of registration requirements along 
with a risk of internal fragmentation, suggesting that the DOPV and the single national 
district helped maintain the status quo of no national-level representation of indigenous 
factions. 
One may now argue that things should have improved due to the use of smaller, 
more numerous districts during the 2001 elections. However, small districts are usually 
argued to discourage proportionality, since they provide access to the political stage for 
smaller number of actors/parties (Katz 1980, 1997, Taagepera and Shugart 1989). It may 
appear somewhat contradictory to argue against large and small districts, yet the negative 
implications of a very large district in conjunction with registration requirements in Peru 
have been explained above. I am not arguing against the commonly accepted notion that 
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larger districts make representation more proportional, I am arguing however that in the 
case of Peru's electoral system with DOPV and registration requirements, the single 
national district has encouraged fragmentation and therefore may have helped to prevent 
smaller, possibly indigenous factions, from achieving enough stability to be electorally 
viable. It could then be argued that very small districts may discourage party 
fragmentation, yet may give larger parties an advantage over smaller competitors, as the 
former would most likely be able to gamer greater support. With only a small number of 
seats to contest, the amount of votes needed to secure one of those seats increases, while 
chances for small parties decrease. If indigenous factions were to participate in national 
electoral races in the future, they would most likely start out as a small political force, 
and could therefore be disadvantaged by smaller district size. 
Let us then tum to Table 3 .2, showing district magnitudes for the 2001 elections. 
I will consider the values for average district magnitude without Lima, since this district 
is an outlier and could skew the results in favor of my argument. I differentiate between 
indigenous people in the Amazon and Sierra regions, as they are inherently dissimilar as 
will be discussed later on. The average district magnitude should be an indicator of how 
likely it is for smaller factions (potentially indigenous political movements in the future) 
to win seats in the legislature. As the table suggests, indigenous people in the Amazon 
are the least likely to gain representation, followed by the indigenous people in the Sierra. 
It then seems, solely by the consideration of district magnitude, that if indigenous people 
had viable political organizations to channel their demands and participate in the 
legislative process, these organizations would be much less likely to achieve 
representation in Congress. Furthermore, having a small district magnitude in districts 
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with indigenous populations could be part of the explanation why viable electoral 
vehicles have not yet formed: they seem to have little chance at electoral success when 
competing with larger, established factions. 
When looking at Table 3 .2, it is easy to notice that Lima has an immediate 
advantage over all other districts, with a district magnitude of 35. The capital then sends 
one quarter of the nation's representatives to Congress, giving the district immense 
leverage in decision-making processes. In comparison, all eleven indigenous districts 
combined send 34 representatives to Congress, and all non-indigenous districts less Lima 
send 51 deputies to Congress. Overall then, non-indigenous districts combined send 86 
deputies to Congress, giving them 72 percent of the vote in the legislature. These 
districts are located in the coastal region, demonstrating well the large difference in 
political influence between the "Costa" and the rest of the country (which is where 
indigenous people ultimately live). This concentration of power on the coast has been 
credited as being one of the factors that is responsible for the lack of indigenous access to 
political resources, being very distanced from the center of action. 
Overall then, the electoral systems used in the 2000 and 2001 elections do not 
seem to have been supportive of the evolvement and/or institutionalization of indigenous 
political vehicles. They could be partially responsible for the fact that no indigenous 
faction has yet won representation in the national legislature. 
Regional Elections 
As the implications of the national electoral system are difficult to test in regards 
to indigenous movements (since none have succeeded), I turn to elections for the regional 
administrative level. These elections were implemented in Peru in 2002, in an effort to 
86 
decentralize power structures. Each region is considered an electoral district, and voters 
elect a regional President, Vice-President, and regional council for tenure of four years. 
The number of members on the regional council equals the number of provinces within a 
district, therefore a minimum of seven, one from each province. The voters chose 
between closed lists, which can be made up of candidates from one party or from 
alliances between different factions. The President and Vice-President come from the list 
that gains the majority of votes, so does the majority of council members (at least half 
plus one seats are allocated to the winning list). The remaining seats are distributed 
among the remaining lists, according to the distribution formula. 
A number of factors need to be considered here. On a positive note, closed lists 
encourage those on the list to work together, as the list that receives the largest number of 
votes is rewarded over-proportionally (i.e. even when a list wins with only 30 percent of 
the vote, it still gets more than 50 percent of the representation on the regional council 
plus the presidency and vice-presidency). This may then be positive for smaller factions 
as internal cohesion is encouraged, helping them to stabilize. Indigenous factions that 
could be electorally successful seem more likely to form under this electoral system, as it 
discourages rivalry among candidates from one list, giving small factions a chance to 
become unified and learn to bargain within their party rather than splitting away. 
Indigenous factions that have a locally concentrated supporter base could benefit 
substantially from even a small victory margin under this system, as long as they receive 
the majority of votes. However, they could also be disproportionally disadvantaged if an 
indigenous movement lost to another faction by a small margin, as the other faction 
would be overcompensated. Overall then, under this type of system, small factions with 
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a locally concentrated supporter base have a good chance to become electorally viable (at 
least at the regional level), and to gain access to representation in the regional council. 
In considering the outcomes of the 2002 elections it is noteworthy that a number 
of political movements that do not belong to the traditionally successful political parties 
have succeeded at gaining seats in regional councils. While the Partido Aprista Peruano 
(PAP), the oldest and most institutionalized party in Peru, gained the majority in thirteen 
of 25 districts, local movements took the lead in seven other districts (five of which are 
indigenous districts). As I am interested in indigenous representation, I focus on 
indigenous districts. Table 3.3 shows political movements that were successful in 
indigenous districts. For example, in Ucayali non-national factions won all but one seat 
in the regional council. What this indicates is that at the local level, under the regional 
electoral system, smaller factions indeed may have a good chance to gain access to the 
regional council, giving them an entry point into politics. This could have a positive 
effect on indigenous mobilization, encouraging Indian political organization at the local 
level. 
As indicated in Table 3.3, some of the already regionally successful political 
movements may indeed be indigenous- based. It is difficult to determine whether a 
movement just bears an indigenous name or symbol or is actually organized around 
ethnicity. The movements indicated as possibly being indigenous in Table 3.4 possess an 
identifying element in their name, either a theme, region, or symbol that is identified with 
indigenous ethnicity. However, it may be just that: a symbol or gesture to garner 
indigenous support. Information on the hundreds of small movements in Peru is hardly 
accessible. Gregory Schmidt (2004b ), a political scientist specializing in Peruvian and 
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Peruvian-indigenous politics, also contents that many groups may identify themselves as 
"cholos", or individuals with indigenous roots, yet would not be "self-consciously 
indigenous movements".3 The only exception to this would be in the Amazon region, 
since people there identify themselves as natives, or indigenous. The "possibly 
indigenous" movement in Table 3.3 that is labeled Amazon is therefore most likely 
organized around ethnic identity. 
I will then argue that indigenous movements seem to have had some success in 
regional elections, possibly indicating that there is a chance for them to eventually move 
up to the national level. How this advancement would be possible, however, is another 
question. As the regional electoral system tends to encourage intra-faction unification, 
the national electoral system seems to discourage it. Furthermore, many movements 
successful at the local level are organized around local identity and context, which may 
give them a disadvantage if they want to expand their support base to the national level. 
Regionalism generally does not produce solid political movements, as they are unable to 
expand beyond regional identity and supporter base. If we then look at the factions that 
won the majority of regional seats in Huanuco, Junin, and Loreto, we notice that their 
names reveal strong regional identity (i.e. "Fight for Huanuco", United for Junin ... , 
United for Loreto ... ). Even if these districts were to elect such factions to the national 
Congress, their influence on the legislative process would most likely be minimal, with 
those districts entertaining a rather small district magnitude. 
Finally, the overall role ofregional governments needs to be taken into 
consideration. While the return to local level government indicates the beginnings of 
decentralization (which should theoretically help marginalized sectors gain political 
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representation), the regional government's powers and duties are as of yet relatively ill-
defined (Andrianzen et al. 2002). Furthermore, regional governments depend on the 
national government for fiscal support, and are therefore rather weak and possess little 
political leverage (Schmidt 2004aa). How much importance can we then attribute to the 
political movement success at the regional level? It seems that there may be room for 
better definition of the regional governments' role possibly leading to increased political 
power in the future, as they are still in their initial phase of operation (they came into 
existence in 2003 ). Thus, from this angle, political success at the local level may then be 
the first step towards changes in the national arena. Regional politics also often provide 
grounds for political recruitment, but so far this has only happened in the larger Peruvian 
cities (Schmidt 2004a). Recruitment from the rural indigenous regions is, at this point, 
less likely to occur, since there is no overarching national indigenous movement. 
Overall, the success of smaller political movements (some indigenous based) at 
the regional level should be seen as positive, as it seems to give these factions some 
involvement in decision-making processes, seems to encourage intra-party bargaining 
and consolidation, and could provide hands-on political training to party representatives 
that strive to eventually become successful in national elections. However, given the 
limitations of regional government influence at the national level, as well as the potential 
difficulties related to the differences in the regional and national electoral systems and 
political movement orientations (as discussed above), we should be careful not to 
attribute too much significance to these developments, as indigenous people are still far 
from having any political influence on national legislative processes. 
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Voter Turnout 
An essential indicator of political activism, voter turnout could help reveal what level of 
support indigenous factions may be able to receive in the future. In a comparison between 
the two national elections of 2000 and 2001 and the regional election of2002 I hope to be 
able to observe a trend towards or away from greater political participation. 
Table 3.4 reveals turnout levels from the three elections mentioned above, as well 
as a categorization of district size, which I use to determine whether there is a trend 
observable in indigenous districts related to the scope of the electorate. The majority of 
electoral districts have between 30,000 and 870,000 eligible voters (only one is 
significantly larger: Lima with an electorate of 5,066,395). I therefore apply the labels 
small (S), medium (M), large (L), and extra-large (XL) in 200,000 voter increments, 
arguing that this categorization proportionally divides districts into comparable units 
(comparable by size). 
Voting is mandatory for all Peruvian citizens between 18 and 70 years of age. 
This may explain in part why the percentages for voter turnout are relatively high. 
However, if we look at the turnout rates for 1990 and 1995 (68.4 and 63.4 percent, 
respectively), when mandatory voting was also in place, in comparison with 2000 and 
2001 (82.3 and 79.1 percent, respectively), we notice that political participation seems to 
have increased significantly (IDEA 2004). While many other factors, such as fear of SL 
attacks to polling stations, may have affected voter turnout in the 1990s, the observation 
of a steep increase in turnout shows that mandatory voting is not the only issue 
influencing how many people go to the polls. The level of interest in political 
participation may therefore be a factor as well. 
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Overall voter turnout between 2000 and 2001 dropped by an average of 3.2 
percent. This can be explained in part by growing voter apathy, since Fujimori's third run 
for the presidency was unconstitutional and his rubber-stamp legislature had 'interpreted' 
the law in Fujimori's favor, further compromising its own legitimacy. The campaign for 
the 2001 elections was also often overtaken by the revelation of many outrages from the 
Fujimori period (Schmidt 2003), causing the election to receive less public attention. 
Another factor that needs to be considered is what I call "election-fatigue": after going to 
the polls less than a year earlier, voters may have felt less compelled to voice their 
preference for a leader again in such a short time period, especially considering the 
scandals they witnessed shortly after the last election. These outrages may have very well 
further compromised the public's trust in government and therefore discouraged them 
from voting. 
The 2002 regional elections paint a different picture. Overall voter turnout 
increased by 3.52 percent, in districts such as Amazonas and Loreto even seven percent 
more ballots were cast than in the previous year at the national level. How could these 
differences be explained? Voters may have felt less distanced from a regional 
government than the national government. As discussed in a previous section, many 
smaller parties and independent political movements were able to compete at the regional 
level, giving voters more choices. These smaller movements may have been more 
successful at pulling together local votes, promising a break from larger factions that 
have not fulfilled voter's expectations in the past. Regional elections, as they were not 
held under Fujimori, also seem to be less "tainted" by his legacy, making them more 
appealing to the masses that suffered under his regime. 
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In examining turnout closer, it is noticeable that the fluctuation in voter turnout 
over the three years is greater in indigenous districts than in the coastal regions. From 
2000 to 2001, voter turnout in districts where indigenous people are concentrated 
decreased by 3.81 percent, compared to the non-native districts where it fell by 2.85 
percent. The difference is even greater in 2002: turnout increased in indigenous districts 
by 4.45 percent, in coastal regions by 2.62 percent.4 District size may be an explanatory 
factor: In a smaller district the overall percentage of voter turnout may change if even a 
small number of voters are added or subtracted from the total. Let me explain this with a 
simple example: If district A has 1 OOO eligible voters, and district B has 100 eligible 
voters, and 50 people do not show up to cast their ballot in either district, the effect on 
district B is much larger than on district A (turnout would be 50 percent and 95 percent, 
respectively). Thus, since more than 70 percent of indigenous districts in Peru are small 
or medium sized, and 54 percent of non-indigenous districts have a large or extra-large 
electorate, results could have been affected just by the number of eligible voters in each 
region (see Table 3.4). 
However, I argue that an increase in turnout of an average 4.45 percent (in two 
indigenous districts even seven percent) is too large to be attributed only to district size. I 
argue that such an increase could have been propelled by a rise in political activism in the 
highland and Amazon regions, which could mean an increase in indigenous political 
activism. As I have discussed earlier, some factions participated and succeeded in the 
elections under an indigenous label, possibly aiming their campaign at the indigenous 
vote. While it is hard to assess whether this was done merely to tap another source of 
votes or in order to represent indigenous interests, the targeting of indigenous symbols 
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seems to have had at least a small positive effect on indigenous political participation. 
While it is clear that what I label as indigenous districts are not territories inhabited solely 
by native peoples, the latter are indeed part of the electorate. The fact that districts with a 
large proportion of indigenous inhabitants such as Amazonas, Cajamarca, and Loreto 
have had an increase in voter turnout of seven, six, and seven percent respectively 
confirms this notion, as it is unlikely that the non-indigenous segments of these regions 
alone brought about such a large change. 
What may this mean for indigenous representation in Peru? An increase in 
indigenous political participation may eventually lead to the formation of indigenous 
based movements or factions, as they may find a broader support base. Political activism 
may also increase communication among the indigenous, as different groups become 
more involved in the political process. Communication then may lead to greater 
coalescence, as different factions may realize that their goals are more similar than 
different. While this may seem far-fetched, it is not entirely removed from reality: 
Looking at the different tribes in the Amazon region for example, the outsider may easily 
notice that the problems are similar for most of them: the extractive industry (particularly 
for hydrocarbons such as oil and natural gas) is destroying their habitats, disturbances in 
indigenous communities are also caused by the state's counter-narcotics efforts (Dean 
2002). Due to isolation and traditional conflicts not visible to the outsider, the different 
groups do not work together. If they are forced to interact with each other, for example in 
the political arena, they may realize that coalescence is much more effective a tool to 
reach common goals than competition. Indigenous movements in either Ecuador or 
Bolivia were not politically successful until they began working together. To explore the 
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potential for this to happen in Peru, I now focus my discussion on some of the factors that 
have been said to be responsible for the lack of a national level indigenous movement, 
and compare them with the situation in Bolivia and Ecuador. 
Prospects for Indigenous Political Mobilization 
Table 3.5 shows a summary of how different factors affecting indigenous 
mobilization compare in the three Andean countries that are subject of this study. At first 
glance it seems that Ecuador and Peru are very different (in terms of these factors), and 
that Bolivia has similarities with both countries. These differences and similarities may 
then further highlight some of the difficulties indigenous groups in Peru will face and 
need to overcome to become more successful in terms of organization and political 
participation. It also illustrates that these obstacles are not insurmountable, since in a 
country like Bolivia (that has experienced political upheaval, extreme instability, and a 
division between high-and lowland indigenous peoples just like Peru) indigenous factions 
are slowly gaining more political influence. 
It seems that the main factor preventing indigenous mobilization in Peru is the 
reluctance to self-identify as indigenous people. The traditionally negative connotation 
that the label "indio" has carried for centuries was further reinforced in recent history, for 
example through the organization of Sendero Luminoso around indigenous identity, and 
the disregard of rights granted to indigenous communities by the Fujimori regime and the 
extractive industry (i.e. land titling and community rights). The latter reinforced the 
notion that indigenous people's rights are existent on paper but can be trampled if it 
benefits those in power, maybe because natives are generally seen as weak and 
backwards. The stigma that is associated with being a native, however, could become less 
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intense if political visibility and influence of indigenous groups rises; such as it has in 
Bolivia and Ecuador. The ones that need to overcome the negativity of indigenous 
identity first and foremost are the indigenous themselves: otherwise mobilization around 
ethnicity is not likely to happen. While this may be a drawn out process (as we see in 
Bolivia and Ecuador, even after decades of indigenous mobilization the stigma has 
diminished but not disappeared), it is a necessary one if indigenous representation in 
political processes is the goal. 
The cholos in the cities may be key to such an effort: many of them are 
rediscovering their native roots, and are following old traditions such as indigenous 
festivities etc., while also partaking in the modem aspects of city life. While the majority 
of them are poor and live in slums called "pueblos jovenes", conditions are slowly 
improving as employment and housing are becoming more available (Harlowe, 2004). 
This group may then serve as a link between the "hinterland" (Sierra and Amazon) and 
the center of politics, as they most likely will have better access to education and political 
resources than those indigenous living in locations remote from the urban centers of 
political and social activity. 
Indigenous movements in Bolivia and Ecuador faced divisions and conflict in 
their early stages, and as they grew larger and more competitive they were finally left 
with the option to coalesce and grow to the national level, or to stall at their current stage 
of success. The process of compromising and fusing different movements together was a 
drawn out one, and is still going on to an extent. In Peru, there are seemingly no local 
movements that have yet grown large enough to overstep the boundary into another 
movement's territory in the attempt to expand their own constituency. Until that happens, 
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there does not seem to be a necessity to cooperate with one another. If smaller indigenous 
movements then can built on the limited success they have had in local elections, and 
grow, they will eventually arrive at the point where they have to face another 
movement's territory (especially considering the vast number oflocal movements in 
Peru). At this point, if they are striving towards enlargement, they will have to coalesce. 
Looking at the histories of indigenous movements in Bolivia and Ecuador, it seems likely 
that in Peru coalescence is possible, given the prevalence of the indigenous situation 
(destruction of habitat, poverty, suppression etc.), an already existing indigenous identity 
in the Amazon region, an emerging coca-growers' identity in the highlands (as in 
Bolivia), local-level political success of some indigenous movements, and increasing ties 
of indigenous communities to the political centers (through cholos). I would not argue 
that coalescence would develop at a fast pace, but rather that there is the likelihood that it 
would develop at all. 
Conclusions 
Over the past few Peruvian elections, we have witnessed some positive trends that 
may eventually lead to a greater indigenous political representation in the future. 
Increased voter turnout at regional elections, particularly in indigenous districts, 
combined with some sub-national success of indigenous movements possibly propelled 
by the regional electoral system's tendency to encourage intra-faction consolidation, may 
give the impression that Peruvian indigenous political success will soon follow in the 
footsteps of its neighbors Bolivia and Ecuador. 
However, while the national electoral system in Bolivia and Ecuador has been 
able to dampen the electoral success rate of indigenous factions in the countries' 
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legislatures, the national electoral system in Peru may have more detrimental effects on 
indigenous representation in the national Congress. The difference is that in Ecuador and 
Bolivia indigenous mobilization and movements were well underway before the current 
electoral systems were put in place, where in Peru electoral system reforms happened 
before there was any national level indigenous organization or movement in place. The 
potentially fragmenting effects of the DOPV, and the restricting impact of a small district 
magnitude in indigenous districts therefore seems to have a graver impact in Peru, where 
they could help prevent indigenous organizations from consolidation at the national level, 
therefore possibly hindering their overall entrance onto the national political stage. While 
there are signs that we should not "write off" indigenous political mobilization in Peru as 
unlikely to happen (as discussed in the preceding section), this analysis shows that the 
national electoral system may further complicate and prolong the process of national 
indigenous political representation, even more so than in the neighboring Andean 
countries. 
1 Examples of these offices are the Defensoria del Pueblo (a national Ombudsman defending human rights) 
and the Ministerio de Promoci6n de la Mujer y de! Desarrollo Humano (PROMUDEH, designed to 
improve indigenous people's welfare). For more information, see: Dean, Bartholomew. 2002. "State Power 
and Indigenous Peoples in Peruvian Amazonia: A Lost Decade, 1990-2000." In The Politics of Ethnicity: 
Indigenous Peoples in Latin American States, ed. David Maybury-Lewis. Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press: 199-238. 
2 The authoritarian leader Fujimori and his party (Peru 2000) ruled Peru for a decade, and the party's 
decline following Fujimori's exit opened political space in which other parties (including smaller ones) 
could compete. However, only one congressional election has passed since, and the shifts in party 
composition in Congress between 2000 and 200 I would mostly be attributed to changing regime and power 
structures, rather than to the DOPV or other components of the electoral system. 
3 Cholos are refugees of indigenous origin who fled from the rural areas to the cities, particularly Lima. 
Many of them tried to escape Sendero Luminoso's terror. The majority of them live in Pueblos Jovenes (or 
shantytowns) in the outskirts of the city (Degregori 1999). 
4 These estimates were calculated from Table 3.4 without the consideration of Lima, as to avoid the 
comparison of dissimilar values. In the 2000 and 200 I elections, the electoral district of Lima included the 
city itself and was made up of 5,066,395 voters, while the 2002 regional elections concerned only the 
provincial part of the district (503,693 voters), excluding the city. Turnout therefore reflects a different 
electorate in the national and regional elections. 
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Table 3.1: Districts with an Indigenous Concentration, Peru. 
n· t . t N El t t * R . ** I d" IS TIC ame ec ora e eg10n n 1genous 
Amazonas 165,589 A ~~ 
An cash 595,791 c 
Apurimac 184,655 s 
Arequipa 697,456 c 
Ayacucho 292,360 s ~ 
Cajamarca 638,285 s ~~ 
Callao 483,254 
-
Cusco 599,712 s ~ 
Huancavelica 208,209 s 
Huanuco 353,829 s ·::.;~ 
lea 412,903 c 
Junin 673,114 s ~ 
La Libertad 863,245 c 
Lambayeque 614,050 c 
Lima 5,066,395 c 
Loreto 371,138 A ~~ 
Madre de Dios 38,323 A ~~ 
Moquegua 89,802 c 
Pasco 133,111 s ~ 
Piura 816,314 c 
Puno 622,923 A ~ 
San Martin 308,717 A ~ 
Tacna 146,429 c 
Tum bes 92,046 c 
Ucayali 181,995 A ~..J 
*This number is based on the registered voters in each district in the 2001 National 
Elections. 
** A=Amazon or Selva, S=Sierra (highlands), C=Coast 
~ estimate based on geographical location 
~..J estimate based on linguistic family (see Brack Egg, Antonio, and Carlos Yanez. Eds. 
1997. Amazonia Peruana: Comunidades Jndigenas, Conocimientos y Tierras Tituladas. 
Lima: BIBLOS S.A.) 
All estimates are compared with Birnir, Johanna. 2001. Party System Stabilization in New 
Democracies: The Effect of Ethnic Heterogeneity on Volatility of Electoral Preferences. 
Ph.D. diss, University of California, Los Angeles: 191. 
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Table 3.2: District Magnitude in the 2001 Peruvian National Legislative Elections. 
D' . N D' . M I d" 1stnct ame 1stnct ag. n 1genous 
Amazonas 2 ,j--j 
An cash 5 
Apurimac 2 
Arequipa 5 
Avacucho 3 .J 
Caiamarca 5 ··:v.J 
Callao 4 
Cusco 5 .J 
Huancavelica 2 
Huanuco 3 .Jl 
lea 4 
Junin 5 .J 
La Libertad 7 
Lambayeque 5 
Lima 35 
Loreto 3 .J.J 
Madre de Dios 1 .J.J 
Moquegua 2 
Pasco 2 .J 
Piura 6 
Puno 5 
San Martin 3 .J 
Tacna 2 
Tum bes 2 
Ucayali 2 .J.J 
Average District Magnitude 4.80 
(ADM) (3.55)* 
ADM indizenous Amazon 2.67 
ADM indif{enous Sierra 3.60 
ADM non-indigenous 7.00 
(4.2)* 
*The district of Lima presents an outlier with a district magnitude (dm) of 35 (the next 
highest dm is 7); the value in parenthesis therefore shows the average district magnitude 
without Lima . 
.J estimate based on geographical location (Amazon or Sierra) 
.J.J estimate based on linguistic family (see Brack Egg, Antonio, and Carlos Yafiez. Eds. 
1997. Amazonia Peruana: Comunidades lndigenas, Conocimientos y Tierras Tituladas. 
Lima: BIBLOS S.A.) 
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Table 3.3: Political Movement Success in Indigenous Districts, Regional Elections, 
2002, Peru 
Movement District (#of seats won) Possibly indigenous? 
Movimiento Independiente Ayacucho ( 1) 
Integraci6n Regional 
Movimiento Democratico Cusco (1) 
Juntos Por el Progreso 
Partido Inka Pachakuteq Cusco (1) Yes 
Movimiento lndependiente Huanuco (P, VP, 7) 
"Luchemos por Huanuco" 
Movimiento Popular Huanuco (1) 
Regional 
Unidos por Junin Sierra y 
Selva Junin (P, VP, 6) 
Movimiento Todos Por 
Junin Junin (1) 
Unidos por Loreto-Unipol 
Loreto (P, VP, 5) 
Movimiento Independiente 
Fuerza Loretana Loreto (1) 
Selva Sur 
Madre de Dios (1) 
Concertaci6n en la Region 
por la Descentralizaci6n Pasco (P, VP, 5) 
Movimiento Independiente Yes (Amazon) 
Nueva Amazonia San Martin (1) 
U cayali (P, VP, 5) 
Movimiento Independiente 
Integrando Ucayali Ucayali (1) 
P=President, VP=Vice President 
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Table 3.4: Voter Turnout by District in the National Congressional Elections 2000 
and 2001, Regional Elections 2002, in Peru 
R . 2000 I % 2001 I % 2002 d. * s· 2 eg10n + - 0 + - 0 In igenous IZe 
Amazonas 80 -5 75 +7 82 -N s 
An cash 83 -4 79 0 79 L 
Apurimac 80 -5 75 +3 78 s 
Arequipa 90 -4 86 +2 88 XL 
Ayacucho 76 -4 72 +3 75 '1 M 
Caiamarca 81 -5 76 +6 82 '1'1 XL 
Callao 84 -2 82 +3 85 L 
Cusco 79 +1 80 0 80 '1 L/XL3 
Huancavelica 76 -3 73 +4 77 M 
Huanuco 75 -5 70 +5 75 '1'1 M 
lea 85 +1 86 +3 89 L 
Junin 82 -2 80 +2 82 ~ XL 
La Libertad 83 -3 80 +3 83 XL 
Lambayeque 87 -3 84 +2 86 XL 
Lima 85 -2 83 +3 86** -
Loreto 77 -4 73 +7 80 ~'1 M 
Madre de Dios 75 -5 70 +6 76 '1'1 s 
Moquegua 90 -3 87 +2 89 s 
Pasco 82 -6 76 +5 81 '1 s 
Piura 85 -3 82 +4 86 XL 
Puno 85 -1 84 +3 87 XL 
San Martin 81 -4 77 +4 81 '1 M 
Tacna 92 -3 89 +1 90 s 
Tum bes 88 -3 85 +4 89 s 
Ucayali 76 -3 73 +4 77 '1'1 s 
Average 82.28 -3.2 79.08 3.52 82.52 
*indigenous concentration in this district 
**The district Lima here means the provincial part of the region, therefore excluding the 
city Lima. 
2: Districts are categorized according to electorate size: S= 0-200,000 ; M=200,001-
400,000; L=400,001- 600,000; XL=600,001 and above: based on 2001 national election 
data 
3.Cusco had 599,712 registered voters, and is therefore less than 300 votes away from the 
classification as an Extra-Large District. Thus, I apply both measures Land XL. 
'1 estimate based on geographical location 
'1'1 estimate based on linguistic family (see Brack Egg, Antonio, and Carlos Yanez. Eds. 
1997. Amazonia Peruana: Comunidades Indigenas, Conocimientos y Tierras Tituladas. 



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The three preceding chapters have shown that the proportional representation 
electoral systems in place for the legislatures in Bolivia, Ecuador, and Peru seem to have 
a negative effect on the formation (in Peru) and further institutionalization and electoral 
success (in Bolivia and Ecuador) of indigenous factions. I do not argue that PR systems 
overall have a negative effect on indigenous representation, but rather that the specific 
characteristics of the PR systems discussed in this analysis may have such an effect. The 
mechanics with which the PR systems have been applied in these three countries seem to 
have influenced indigenous representation negatively. This suggests that there is indeed 
a correlation between the type of electoral system in place and the level of indigenous 
representation that is likely to be achieved in the national legislature. The overall 
implication is that institutional factors inherent to electoral systems may slow down or 
hinder indigenous political organization that could essentially allow for greater 
indigenous access to political resources. 
Another common argument that has been explored in all three cases is that 
indigenous groups have not achieved full cooperation with each other for the "common 
good" (even though they have realized a more significant level of collaboration in Bolivia 
and Ecuador than in Peru). I suggest in my findings that the failure of the ambitious 
leadership of indigenous parties prevents cooperation, at least to an extent. In Bolivia, I 
found that the electoral system's encouragement of small party entrance seems to further 
encourage leaders to pursue their own goals; in Ecuador the parallel vote seems to 
support intra-party competition between candidates, and the DOPV in Peru may promote 
individual-focused voter choice rather than one based on party or agenda, thereby 
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encouraging the personalistic orientation of leaders. Therefore, as the PR electoral 
system seems to encourage and exacerbate the tendencies and opportunities of such 
leaders to follow their personal objectives rather than to act for the common indigenous 
interest, I argue that the electoral system is in fact a causal factor for the "personalismo" 
that has been observed within indigenous leadership structures, which may have 
contributed to the slow institutionalization of indigenous factions. 
Some may argue that the applicability of the results of this study is somewhat 
limited by the fact that indigenous representation was considered mainly at the national 
level, rather than probing deeper into the local level where indigenous factions have been 
significantly more successful in all three countries. While the lower levels of government 
provide a good training ground and the first level of access to the political stage for many 
indigenous organizations, I argue that representation in these bodies does not yet ensure 
the channeling of the same amount of demands as representation at the national level 
would. This argument is based on the fact that decentralization is a relatively new 
phenomenon in all three countries. The national government still holds the majority of 
decision-making power, as many of the smaller administration units are still fiscally 
dependent on the central organ, and therefore lack a considerable amount of autonomy. I 
do acknowledge, however, as their roles become more manifested regional and municipal 
governments will play a significant role in the future. We can witness the beginnings of 
this in Bolivia and Ecuador, where the transfer of responsibilities and resources to local 
governments began in 1994 and 1997, respectively, and has advanced further than in 
Peru. 
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Naturally, there are alternative factors not addressed here that may influence the 
level of indigenous representation in the legislature. These may include indigenous 
poverty, cultural factors that may inhibit successful participation in the political arena 
(for example the traditional social organization into ayllus in Bolivia, as discussed in 
Chapter 1 ), or grass roots and foreign support of indigenous political development 
through non-governmental organizations. I do not, however, argue that the findings of 
this study are exclusive, but rather that they need to be considered within the "big 
picture". The attribution of explanatory power to single variables may be feasible in the 
process of developing theory, but has only limited applicability in the real world of policy 
formation. It is clear that institutional, social, cultural, and economic factors together 
create the environment that determines who will hold political and economic power in a 
country. 
This thesis makes a contribution to the field of political science in that it 
challenges the overly positive image a number of scholars have created in regards to the 
inclusion of indigenous peoples in the decision-making processes of their countries. It 
undermines the overall assumption that proportional representation systems usually foster 
the political representation of marginalized or repressed sectors of society, since such a 
system can discourage the institutionalization of small factions, subsequently decreasing 
their chances for electoral success. Finally, this study adds three cases to the extensive 
literature on electoral laws and their effects, therefore providing practical testing grounds 
for existing theory. 
The main purpose of this analysis is to show that despite apparent electoral 
successes of indigenous people's movements that are seeking access to the national 
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political stage, the way to representation of their interests is still long. The electoral 
system needs to be considered when formulating any policy that is aimed at the inclusion 
of marginalized sectors of society into the political process. Such policy may then help 
prevent future extra-systemic struggles by peoples who do not feel their interests are 
sufficiently represented within the existing political structure. 
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